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ABSTRACT 
__________ 
This study places the 2011-2012 Russian protests within the framework of Eurasian mass-civil 
mobilisation. Researchers have examined the shared and divergent properties of these events, 
commonly labelled „colour revolutions.‟ However, research has not employed the experience of 
the colour revolutions to understand the current civil unrest in Russia. Drawing on existing 
research, this study generates a „colour revolution‟ framework and applies it to the case study of 
the 2011-2012 Russian protests. This approach allows the Russian protests to be analysed in 
relation to „colour revolutions‟ in societies that are geographically, politically and historically 
proximate.  This study finds that the current protests are the immediate result of perceptions of 
extensive electoral fraud. However, the underlying drivers are gradual socio-economic shifts 
toward the growth of the middle class, and the increasing predisposition of the Russian 
government towards a „managed democracy.‟  This thesis concludes that based on the 
idiosyncrasies and political diversity of the Russian pro-democracy protests, it must be 
considered a “Grey Revolution” – a mix of colours. Due to these factors it is unlikely that the 
movement will succeed in its goals in the short term. However, the need for future research to 
focus on the longer-term prospects of this „Grey Revolution‟ is clear.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Russia’s Grey Revolution 
__________________ 
 
Posing the problem 
Over the previous decade, the „colour revolutions‟ have served as a defining feature of 
politics across the post-Soviet world. Fronted by the youth and the emerging middle class, 
these episodes are as much a product of the hopes and aspirations of the new generations as 
they are a legacy of the old. Their backers have been domestic political and economic elites 
seeking change in the national leadership, generally one that is of benefit to themselves, but 
also that is often positive for democratic development.  Foreign organisations and 
governments have also intervened to support these „democratic awakenings,‟ though with 
varying magnitudes from case to case. These colour revolutions have been upward markers in 
the oscillating post-Soviet democratisation process that began in 1991, and which has often 
seemed otherwise stagnant and in some cases regressive. The authoritarian incumbents of 
post-Soviet Eurasia have come to fear such instances of mass civil mobilisation, and with 
good reason. Mass anti-authoritarian protests spear-headed by young, urban, educated and 
relatively prosperous men and women have, in recent decades, been a harbinger of the 
overthrow of many authoritarian regimes in Europe, Asia and Latin America. The formats of 
these middle class rebellions have changed over time and location. The colour revolution 
represents a unique „way of doing things‟ in present day post-Soviet Eurasia.  
 Identifying the exact nature of colour revolutions has been the focus of some effort in 
the academic community. A central question has been whether these events have any real 
relationship with the „classic‟ examples of revolution, of which the 1917 Russian Revolution 
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is a prime example. A second subject of academic effort has been identifying the root causes 
and processes of the colour revolutions while accounting for their idiosyncrasies. Several 
notable academics have attempted to do this, primarily via comparative studies of the four 
„successful‟ colour revolutions. Chronologically, these are the 2000 White Revolution in 
Serbia, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the 
2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Michael McFaul (2005) and Taras Kuzio (2008) in 
particular have enumerated the common features of colour revolutions, making them suitable 
for application as a framework of analysis.  
 Into this sequence of Eurasian mass mobilisations and colour revolutions have 
emerged the mass protests in the Russian Federation. They have followed the controversial 
2011 legislative election that re-elected, with parliamentary majority, United Russia 
(Yedinaya Rossiya) - the „party of power‟ of the current Russian President, Vladimir Putin. 
Like the other colour revolutions, the mass street demonstrations were sparked by reports of 
extensive electoral fraud. These protests represent the largest mass mobilisation of the 
Russian citizenry in decades. Also unique are the grievances of the protesters, which are 
largely political and directed at the Federal government, and even at Putin himself. Previous 
protests in Russia have largely emerged out of economic discontent, and have generally been 
directed at lower levels of government, such as regional and metropolitan. In this sense the 
current wave of protests across Russia is unique, and bears more resemblance to the colour 
revolutions than to anything that has occurred in the country previously. 
 Where have these new Russian protests come from? What is their historical, political 
and societal basis? And what can the experiences of the colour revolutions tell us about their 
meaning and where they, Russian society, and the Russian state are heading? In light of 
where the colour revolutions have already taken certain countries in the post-Soviet Eurasia 
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region, these questions are of crucial importance to academics, regional analysts and policy-
makers. Answering these questions is the central purpose of this study. 
 
The argument in brief 
Alluding to the naming tradition of the colour revolutions, this study dubs the Russian post-
electoral protests the „Grey Revolution.‟ It does so for two reasons. First, while often 
perceived as a colour, grey is also indicative of the absence of colour. This represents the 
relatively diverse political composition of the protesters, who have been represented by a 
variety of colours including white (the middle classes and liberals), red (leftists and 
communists) and black (anarchists and nationalists). Furthermore, the mixing of colours 
usually yields some form of grey. Second, the orthodox understanding of grey is not as a 
colour, but a shade. This accounts for the idiosyncrasies of the Grey Revolution when 
compared to other colour revolution events. However, this study argues that these nuances 
are natural to the colour revolution phenomenon, as they are a product of a country‟s unique 
state and civil attributes interacting with the modular democratic ideology of the colour 
revolutions. In other words, „applying‟ the ideas of the colour revolution in different states is 
bound to generate country-specific processes due to the state and social conditions inherent in 
that particular state. However, my study argues that these differing processes are not distinct 
enough to render each event incomparable to the next. 
 From this argument the study constructs a model for understanding colour revolutions 
from the work of both McFaul and Kuzio. Under the guidance of this model, the relevant 
state and civil attributes of Russian Federation are derived from its present-day form. The 
application of the model to these attributes yields insights into the origin, and the short- and 
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long-term prospects of the Grey Revolution. Most prominently, the growth and development 
of the middle class and the increasingly authoritarian tendencies of the Russian state are 
pulling Russia in opposite directions. That is not to say that electoral fraud was not a cause, 
but rather that this civil destabilisation has deeper roots. With Russia‟s continual economic 
development, the middle class is unlikely to stop growing as a proportion of the population. 
Thus the relative placidity of the current pro-democracy movement, as well that of Russia as 
a society and state are dependent upon how the political elite chooses to resolve these 
conflicting trends. This is the second central argument of my thesis. Beyond this it is 
sufficient to say that both the model used and case studies chosen (Russia) are modest in 
scope. However, if deemed successful, this model could be used to review the situation of 
Russia in future years, as well as be applied to mass civil mobilisation events in other post-
Soviet Eurasian states. 
 
The organisation of this thesis 
The purpose of this study is to contextualise the Grey Revolution within the broader norms 
and trends of Eurasian mass civil mobilisation. Chapter 1 reviews previous understandings 
and academic works concerning the colour revolutions. From this, the pre-conditions and 
processes of colour revolutions are derived, accounting for both „successful‟ and „failed‟ 
instances. A model for analysing colour revolutions is enumerated from the work of McFaul 
and Kuzio. 
 Chapter 2 examines how judgements of „success‟ and „failure‟ can be made within the 
context of colour revolutions. Also reviewed are the methods by which the semi-autocratic 
incumbents of Eurasian states can influence the calculus of success and failure via specific 
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strategies designed to counter the revolutionary‟s strengths and play to their weaknesses. 
 Chapter 3 recounts the history of the Russian pro-democracy protests. From this, the 
study derives the state and civil attributes of the Russian Federation that are necessary for an 
analysis using the colour revolution model. The most important and prominent derived 
attributes are highlighted and analysed further. 
 Chapter 4 takes a broader perspective on the Grey Revolution. It applies the model 
enumerated in Chapter 1 to the state and civil attributes derived in Chapter 3, before taking a 
holistic view of the current protests. 
 This study concludes by reviewing its findings and noting their implications for the 
Russian Federation. Further, it reflects upon the colour revolutions more generally and notes 
how this study could be used to guide future research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The anatomy of a colour revolution 
_____________________________ 
 
 
Analysis of the current events in the Russian Federation should be contextualised within the 
broader regional trends in post-Soviet
1
 Eurasia that have been observed and documented over 
preceding years by a variety of scholars and academics. These events of mass protest and 
popular mobilisation have most commonly been attributed the label of a „colour revolution,‟ 
taking the name of the colour commonly employed by associated protesters and movement 
supporters in order to display allegiance and lend a sense of unity to their political and civil 
actions.  
 The immediate antecedents of the colour revolutions are the first generation of post-
communist revolutions.  Most commonly labelled as the „revolutions of 1989,‟ these events 
precipitated the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, beginning with the Warsaw Pact. In 
chronological order, these mass civil mobilisation events removed authoritarian Communist 
regimes in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. More 
recent instances such as the White (also known as „Bulldozer‟), Rose and Orange revolutions 
in Serbia
2
, Georgia and Ukraine respectively, are not directly comparable to the events of 
1989 given the time elapsed between them, changes in domestic socio-political conditions 
and evolution of regional and international dynamics. However, there is an important 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this analysis „post-Soviet‟ will be taken to mean all communist states previously under the 
sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, not just the former Soviet Union itself. 
2
 Though referring to Serbia as a „post-Soviet‟ state may be a contested notion  (at least after the Tito-Stalin split 
of 1948), Serbia does fall into the definition of a „post-communist‟ Eurasian state. Furthermore, the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia has led to closer ties between Serbia and the former Soviet states, reinforcing this 
relationship, especially in light of Russian support of Serbia during the NATO intervention campaign in the 
former Yugoslavia. As such this analysis shall treat Serbia as a marginally „post-Soviet‟ state.  
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aesthetic and symbolic relationship to be recognised between them in terms of broader 
regional societal traditions and political development trajectories. 
It is not the purpose of the wider thesis to approach the study of the events in Russia 
in a detached and segregated form, but rather to effectively integrate them into the broader 
phenomenon of mass civil unrest, mobilisation and „colour revolutions‟ that have come to 
dominate the recent socio-political histories and development trajectories of post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe and Eurasia. As such, the selection of the Russian Federation as the primary 
subject of this case study can be justified first on account of it being the most recent in this 
regional trend progression. Second, it can be justified on both its geopolitical importance and 
its implications, which, unlike the other successful and failed colour revolutions are not only 
domestic and regional in nature, but global as well.  
While the previous White, Rose and Orange revolutions did undoubtedly impact upon 
regional norms and global perceptions, Russia‟s role as a regional geopolitical power and 
global political player, as well as its geographic, demographic and economic size, in addition 
to its significant military capabilities, make for an altogether broader and wider-reaching set 
of regionally and globally significant consequences that could result from the outcome of 
current events. Further, events of the „colour revolution‟ archetype in Russia and the other 
states of the post-Soviet periphery can be distinguished from apparently similar developments 
elsewhere in the world, such as the recent wave of unrest, regime change and „revolution‟ in 
Middle Eastern states such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. This is primarily due to the large 
political, historical and cultural differences that exist between these countries and post-Soviet 
Eurasia. Continuing with the same example, political power in the mentioned Middle Eastern 
countries is foremost rooted in the national military structure, while political power in most 
post-Soviet states, including the Russian Federation, tends to derive from a broader set of 
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referent sources, notably the security and intelligence apparatus (Chausovsky, 2011).  
 
The list of notable scholars who have contributed to the topic of mass civil 
mobilisation in post-Soviet Eurasia includes Taras Kuzio, Henry Hale, Elena Korosteleva, 
Andrew Wilson, (current United States ambassador to the Russian Federation) Michael 
McFaul, David Lane, Theodor Tudoroiu, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, among others. 
Some have analysed the phenomenon through single-country case studies, others through 
comparative method, and others still through all-encompassing approaches, such as framing 
colour revolution events as the products of a regional or global democratic diffusion. 
Drawing upon the theories and practical applications of these previous studies and research 
projects creates a notable advantage, insofar as it provides a consistent and adaptable 
theoretical base that is suitable for analysing and defining current protest events in the 
Russian Federation. This is especially important as analysis of these protests and their 
implications is currently lacking in the broader literature, due to their recent and ongoing 
nature.  
Hence what needs to be foremost incorporated into a forward analysis of the 
contemporary Russian Federation is distance, both in the geographic and cultural sense, as 
well as the „distance‟ represented by the passing of time. Such a need can be identified by 
tracking the evolution of the literature itself. For example, the difference between the 
generally positive and optimistic literature during the political peak of colour revolution 
events (2003-05), the more uncertain tone of analyses immediately following this period 
(2006-07), and the more pessimistic and sceptical tone of later analyses (2008-present) is 
readily identifiable and self-evident among the breadth of relevant studies. Such changes may 
reflect differences in scholarly opinions and approaches, but they are also undoubtedly 
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influenced by the changing realities on the ground.  
In terms of geographic and cultural distance, it should be noted that Russian policy 
makers and power-brokers were most concerned with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, a 
primarily Orthodox Christian country of 45 million people with strong historical and cultural 
ties to Russia, a sizable (17.3% of total population) Russian diaspora, and a long contiguous 
geographic border with the Russian Federation. Comparatively, the Tulip Revolution in the 
similarly post-Soviet state of Kyrgyzstan, a primarily non-Slavic Muslim country with a 
population base of 5.5 million, a small Russian minority (9.1% of total population) and no 
shared geographic border with the Russian Federation, elicited a much more subdued 
response from the Russian leadership, to the point of ambivalence (Wilson, 2009). It is thus 
intuitive that it was the Orange, not the Tulip or Rose Revolutions that most affected the 
concerns and psyche of many Russian policy makers, power-brokers and their public 
supporters, as to this day pro-government and „anti-revolutionary‟ groupings in the Russian 
Federation are commonly (and often in a self-described manner) referred to as “anti-Orange” 
forces. 
Time is also a factor that needs to be accounted for in a framework analysing mass 
civil mobilisation in the Russian Federation. The lack of a mass-derived elite rotation in post-
Soviet Eurasia since the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan is indicative that conditions in 
the region, and within the individual post-Soviet states themselves, have changed. That is not 
to say however that a regional social or political democratic tendency has been rendered 
permanently stagnant or stamped out. As has been noted earlier, developments in the former 
Soviet geopolitical space have always been highly dynamic and rarely static.  
The most readily evident conclusion seems to be that the authoritarian regimes in the 
region have successfully learned, at least temporarily, how to counter the structurally modular 
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example that the colour revolutions generally seem to follow.
3
 At the time of writing 
democratic political forces in countries like Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and even Georgia 
certainly seem to have lost some traction and momentum. However, it seems highly unlikely 
that, questionable self-descriptors aside, both pro- and anti-democratic forces in the region 
have halted the consistent revision and evolution of their strategies and counter-strategies 
(Hale, 2006, p306) 
It can thus be said that while the original model of the 2000 White Revolution may no 
longer be the strict format democratic and anti-authoritarian trends take in the region, their 
primary pre-conditions and central processes remain the same, and to some extent, inherent in 
their composition (Finkel and Brudny, 2012a, p2). It is therefore important to derive lessons 
and analytical tools from previous instances of successful and failed colour revolution events, 
in order to prudently analyse the central features of the current protests in the Russian 
Federation, and account for any distinguishing nuances.  
With this in mind, analysing and deriving the pre-conditions and processes of colour 
revolutions, as „successful‟ mass civil mobilisation events in post-Soviet Eurasia, as well as 
those of their less successful counterparts, serves as the central focus of this section. 
 
The nature of colour revolutions: The non-revolutionary revolutions 
The term „revolution‟ is a contested one. Its interpretation is dependent upon the chronologic 
and geographic context of the revolutionary event. As a concept, „revolution‟ has evolved 
since the era of „classic‟ revolutions, Marx‟s so called “locomotives of history” (Tudoroiu, 
                                                 
3
 For a summary of the authoritarian „learning‟ and „diffusion‟ arguments see: Finkel and Brudny (2012), „No 
more colour! Authoritarian regimes and colour revolutions in Eurasia‟; Hale (2006), „Democracy or autocracy 
on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism‟; Korosteleva (2012), 
„Questioning democracy promotion: Belarus' response to the „colour revolutions‟  
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2007). The divergent experience of the colour revolutions makes it clear that analysis of these 
events demands the creation of a theoretical framework beyond the classical conceptions of 
revolutions (Hale, 2006, Lane, 2008, Lane, 2009). 
 The search for such a theory can begin in the era of post-Soviet and post-Communist 
studies, in the transitional features identified by Timothy Garton Ash. These are characterised 
by the “increasing blurring of the line between reform and revolution,” creating what he 
refers to as a “non-revolutionary revolution” in some places, and “refolutions” or 
“revelections” in others. Ash‟s conceptions of revolution in the post-Soviet Eastern European 
state are best summarised by Farideh Farhi as “largely urban events [that] combine an 
insistence on non-violence, or the „well considered use of violence,‟  with the creative use of 
civil disobedience guided by an opposition elite, calculated pleas to world public opinion 
through the use of electronic media, attention and pressure from the outside world, and a 
readiness to negotiate with power holders while refusing to be coopted” (Farhi, 2003). 
More contemporary studies of revolutions can move us closer still to the goal of a 
unitary and universal definition for colour revolutions and similar regional mass civil 
mobilisation events. As Lane points out, to make a truthful interpretation of a colour 
revolution is to acknowledge two realities in these events. First, that the revolution did not 
originate entirely from „below,‟ but also from the elites or counter-elites „above.‟ And 
second, that the results of these revolutions have led to re-alignments in foreign policy and 
shifts in some domestic power balances, but not to an overall systemic change, as ownership 
of property and distribution of wealth have been left largely intact (Lane, 2009). Observing 
that the colour revolutions were usually led by elites who had been present and active within 
the governmental and socio-political structures they were trying to either seize and control, 
Lane concludes that these events bear some resemblance not only to revolutions, but also to 
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what one can traditionally define as a „coup d‟état‟ – a rotation of elites (Lane, 2009, p119). 
This type of event has a high level of elite or counter-elite participation, and a 
reasonably high level of mass involvement by the general public, but primarily of an 
„audience‟ type. The goals of the dissenting group(s) is to redress immediate and potentially 
longer-standing public grievances, promote the objective of transformation within 
government and potentially some entrenched non-governmental state features, and to achieve 
this through a process of partial or complete elite renewal rather than a full-scale 
reconstitution of the political and economic order. Nevertheless, significant and large-scale 
changes short of a full revolution in the socio-political order are still a focus and goal of this 
type of movement. Dissatisfaction with stagnant or falling standards of living, health care 
provision and affordability, distribution of wealth and land assets, and unemployment often 
form a significant proportion of the grievances lodged against the entrenched elite by 
dissenting groups (Lane, 2009, p120).  
Thus it is clear that while colour revolutions do bear an aesthetic resemblance to 
earlier instances of revolutionary activity on the European continent, there are some 
fundamental differences in both their origins and (non-ostensible) outcomes when analysed 
comparatively with „traditional‟ examples of revolution. Most notably, the colour revolution 
hybridises the concept of a revolution with those of the electoral process and state reform, 
reminiscent of Ash‟s conceptions of „refolutions‟ and „revelections.‟ Given that the definition 
of „revolution‟ has consistently evolved and changed as new and divergent events have 
transpired in the course of world history (Goldstone, 2001, p120), it is not out of place nor 
against consistency to view the „colour revolutions‟ as modern archetypes or formats of the 
„classic‟ revolutions. Indeed, modern definitions accommodate for various revolutionary 
„types,‟ including the primarily urban-based „colour revolution‟ typology that combines 
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popular mobilisation elements with elites wishing to reform and replace existing political and 
governmental structures (Goldstone, 2001, p143-144). Additionally, the colour revolution 
archetype meets three antecedent requirements for a modern form of revolution, which are 
(Goldstone, 2001, p142):  
 
a) Efforts to change the political regime that draw on a competing vision (or visions) of 
a just order;  
b) A notable degree of informal or formal mass mobilization, and;  
c) Efforts to force change through non-institutionalized actions such as mass 
demonstrations, protests, strikes, or violence  
 
Hence, while acknowledging that there is some debate surrounding the suitability of 
labelling these events „revolutions,‟ this thesis will continue to refer to „colour revolutions,‟ 
or alternatively, „instances of mass civil mobilisation,‟ for this kind of event in post-Soviet 
Eurasia. Wherever the theoretical delineations of the colour revolutions are ultimately drawn, 
the concept of a revolution as a rapid change in leadership occasioned by a popular uprising 
continues to be etched in the cultural memory of the people living in post-Soviet Eurasia.  
 
Reaching the tipping point: The prerequisites of a colour revolution  
There is general agreement that the primary causes of colour revolutions are socio-economic 
imbalances experienced by the population combined with a set of discontented elites who 
find the current balance of political power to be disagreeable. Their alliance and collective 
action are sparked off by a grievous and transgressive display of political corruption, 
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typically electoral fraud (D'Anieri, 2006, Hale, 2006, Lane, 2009, McFaul, 2005, Tudoroiu, 
2007). At some point in the process the protest either succeeds or fails at reaching the 
“tipping point” (D'Anieri, 2006), the point at which there is a sufficient number of 
participants for the success of a colour revolution or similar event. In this case, the 
participants are those individuals and elites for whom the perceived or potential benefits of 
dissent against the ruling regime outweigh the perceived or potential costs. They are opposed 
to the current ruling elite, though not necessarily the state itself.  
The tipping point concept derives from the threshold model of protest and is based on 
the work of economist and game theorist Thomas Schelling. It can be defined as the quantity 
of protesters required for a colour revolution or similar event to become successful. Once this 
requisite quantity is reached, the movement can be said to have become „safe‟ or „self-
perpetuating.‟ A protest movement that has successfully reached its individual and unique 
tipping point either succeeds outright or „snowballs‟ exponentially in size until it does; a 
protest movement that fails to do so stagnates and eventually declines. 
Conceptually, the tipping point is also an aggregated function based on the sum of the 
utility payoffs of each protester. Individuals are generally sensitive to the costs and benefits 
of participating in protest events, and are likely to weight these risks and their potential 
rewards based on a unique utility function. For example, increases in the size of the protest 
group have a positive effect on an individual‟s willingness to protest, via diluting the 
likelihood of individual oppression by the number of people participating. Such an increase 
also has a less measurable but equally important psychological and symbolic effect upon 
popular perceptions of legitimacy and success probability. This concept was conveyed 
particularly well by Oleksandr Omelchenko, Mayor of Kyiv during the height of the Orange 
Revolution, who told movement leader and future Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko “If 
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you bring out 100,000 I‟m with you, we‟ll take power in one day. If it‟ll be 99,000 I won‟t be 
with you‟‟ (Wilson, 2005, p125).  
Other sources increasing the success probability of a movement, such as greater 
international attention and support can also positively sway the individual „willingness to 
protest.‟ Conversely, factors such as the ability and resolve of security forces to use violence 
against protesters and movement supporters, and the willingness of the judiciary to serve 
entrenched political elites and impose harsh sentences for civil disobedience and dissent, can 
act to negatively impact this function (though it may actually act to embolden the most 
committed participants of the movement). Also, most internal state attributes, such as the 
security and intelligence services, are under the control of elites, potentially both those loyal 
to the government and those committed to the opposition. This has led some to suggest that 
the balance of elites is equally, if not more, important than the balance of protesters (i.e. anti- 
and pro-government demonstrators), and that the actions of elites play a decisive role in 
determining whether or not a colour revolution or similar movement reaches its tipping point 
(D'Anieri, 2006, p333).  
The primary drawback of the tipping point concept is that by its nature, it is only 
quantifiable in retrospect after the successful occurrence of a colour revolution (D'Anieri, 
2006, p334). In the case of a failed instance only the highest protester quantity to the point of 
failure is determinable. While this means that the concept has limited predictive capacity, it 
does not detract from its explanatory function. 
The tipping point serves only as the „smoking gun‟ for an instance of Eurasian mass 
civil mobilisation, the state and society in question must also possess certain attributes upon 
which the initial mass of the protest group is founded (Kuzio, 2008, McFaul, 2005). This 
analysis employs the features of the colour revolution as enumerated by McFaul (2005) and 
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Kuzio (2008) in this and subsequent chapters.  
In a comparative sense McFaul‟s enumeration (acknowledging earlier instances in 
other Eastern European nations) focuses directly on the White, Rose and Orange revolutions, 
and on the more immediate and internal factors inherent within the state. Kuzio‟s list takes a 
somewhat broader view as it accounts for events in the Eastern Europe region and former 
Soviet periphery more generally. By this token, Kuzio‟s enumeration also allows for a 
longer-term societal view by incorporating concepts of civic nationalism and an evolving 
“return to Europe” mentality among the population (Kuzio, 2008, p100). As part of this 
broader and longer term outlook, Kuzio‟s framework additionally incorporates external 
factors and foreign assistance to would-be or existing civil opposition groups (Kuzio, 2008, 
p106-107). This thesis employs the individual observations made by McFaul and Kuzio to 
generate a ten point framework/model that is both inward and outward looking, and that 
accounts for both shorter and longer term causes and factors:  
 
1. A competitive semi-autocratic or -authoritarian state regime that allows enough 
space in the political sphere for the existence of a democratic opposition – Also 
commonly described as a “competitive authoritarian” regime (Kuzio, 2008, p99, 
McFaul, 2005, p7), a system that combines elements of authoritarianism and 
democracy.  
 
2. A ‘return to Europe’ national sentiment or civic nationalism that assists in 
mobilizing civil society – Especially groups pre-disposed to hold these sentiments, 
such as youth, pro-democracy groups and nongovernmental organisations (NGO‟s). 
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The current youth represent the first non-Communist generation as their political 
culture was minimally influenced by communist and Soviet politics. The desire to 
„return to Europe‟ can be a general socio-political undercurrent or generated by 
external incentives, such as EU membership (Kuzio, 2008, p100, 108).  
 
3. A preceding political event or crisis that has weakened the incumbent regime – 
Most commonly, the immediate crisis is the result of a transgressive instance of 
electoral fraud, though holdover factors from longer-lived controversies can also be 
influential (Kuzio, 2008, p100). This includes the ability of the opposition to bring 
public attention to the event or crisis, such as publicising evidence of fraudulent 
electoral results (McFaul, 2005, p10). 
 
4. A media independent and capable enough to effectively convey the instance of the 
falsified vote or other transgression to the broader public – This requisite degree of 
independence can apply to both the freedom of media organisations and to the 
freedom of independent journalists (McFaul, 2005, p7-8) 
 
5. A pro-democratic capital city – In instances of colour revolutions, the national capital 
has generally served as the focal point. Belgrade in Serbia, Tbilisi in Georgia and 
Kyiv in Ukraine were all the main „battlegrounds‟ of their respective colour 
revolutions, all with wholly national implications (Kuzio, 2008, p101-102).  
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6. An unpopular incumbent and/or ruling elite – Falling popularity of the incumbent 
leadership and its supporting elites has been a consistent feature in their decline and 
reduction in ability to undemocratically influence the outcome of the contested 
election (Kuzio, 2008, p102-104, McFaul, 2005, p8-9). The legacy of major scandals 
and controversies often accompanies this decline (Kuzio, 2008, p102) 
 
7. A charismatic opposition candidate – To varying extents, the anti-authoritarian 
movements of post-Communist Eurasia have rallied around a charismatic opposition 
candidate. Typically a member of the national elite, this individual must be able to 
effectively convey themselves as a viable future leader, but also lack the corrupt past 
that is most often popularly and negatively associated with political leaders in the 
region (Kuzio, 2008, p104). 
 
8. A relatively united and organised opposition that is capable of mobilizing tens of 
thousands or more demonstrators – The opposition must display unity in the 
overriding cause of overthrowing the incumbent regime, though not necessarily any 
ideological unity per se. As such, even the appearance of unity may be sufficient at 
the time (McFaul, 2005, p9). In most instances to date, the opposition only genuinely 
united on the eve of the democratic breakthrough, motivated by a heightened prospect 
of success and under pressure from youth, NGO‟s and civil society (Kuzio, 2008, 
p105). 
 
9. Division among the ruling regime’s coercive apparatus – Defined as the split among 
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the “guys with guns.” This includes segments of the state‟s military, police and 
security forces, which diminish the ability of the incumbent to use violence as a form 
of repression  (McFaul, 2005, p14). 
 
10. Foreign intervention and/or support – Foreign governments and organisations can 
intervene with varying levels of directness. External support can include the funding 
of NGO‟s opposed to the incumbent, political and financial support of opposition 
figures and pressure via bilateral or multilateral political instruments.  
 
The process of a colour revolution 
The colour revolutions have been noted by many scholars for their repetitive character and 
modular nature (Beissinger, 2007, Finkel and Brudny, 2012a, Korosteleva, 2012), a set of 
consistent features and processes that seem to have diffused from one instance to the next.  
The most often cited progenitor of this series of consecutive political upheavals is the 
successful 2000 White Revolution in Serbia, which ousted the semi-autocratic nationalist 
regime of President Slobodan Milošević (Beissinger, 2007, p270). The Georgian Rose, 
Ukrainian Orange and the Kyrgyz Tulip Revolutions are generally listed as its successful 
descendants. These instances were followed by a „second generation‟ (2005-2009) of 
attempted, similarly modular revolutionary attempts in Russia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus and Moldova, all of which failed to varying degrees (Korosteleva, 2012, 
p38).  
The most commonly identified source of this spread are revolutionary or anti-
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authoritarian organisations that have learned and/or emulated the tactics and techniques of 
similarly minded groups elsewhere in the region. Beginning with the Serbian youth group 
„Otpor!‟ („Resistance!‟), and spreading onwards to „Kmara!‟ („Enough!‟) in Georgia, „Pora!‟ 
(„It‟s time!‟) in Ukraine and „KelKel‟ („Shining of the good‟). Similar organisations have also 
existed in Eurasian states that have not experienced a colour revolution, such as „Zubr‟ 
(„Bison‟) in Belarus and „Oborona‟ („Defence‟) in Russia. Though these groups often feature 
youth as the forefront and as “ground troops,” they are often supported (either covertly or 
openly) by an entrenched group of national elites (Lane, 2009, p116-117). Evidence exists of 
comprehensive cooperation and a transfer of experience and protest strategies between these 
revolutionary groups. Members have often travelled to states where such actions had 
previously succeeded, most notably Serbia and Georgia, to learn the „technologies‟ and 
tactics necessary for this form of mass-inspired civil mobilisation (Korosteleva, 2012, p38). 
These organisations can be said to be followers or students of the democratic 
revolutionary handbook (Rakhmanova, 2006), a metaphorical term for the particular mix of 
strategies and tactics native to colour revolution youth organisations, with the express aim of 
mass civil mobilisation. These elements are structured around three central necessitating 
pillars: the unification of various diverse indigenous opposition groups, an adherence to non-
violent tactics and the creation of a carefully planned short- and medium-term political 
strategy. While the underlying theme of such activity is to remove corrupt and aspiring 
autocratic governments, the mere will to do so is not in itself enough. Specific techniques 
employed by these groups include fund-raising from Western organisations, creating 
memorable and „marketable‟ organisational names and symbols (especially for transmission 
via media channels), combining agitation and propaganda (agitprop) with public relations, 
and using the aforementioned techniques to simultaneously get out the protesters and the vote 
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(Rakhmanova, 2006). The ability of these tactics and strategies to plug into the socio-political 
structures of a variety of similar states is primarily what accords them their modular nature. 
The interplay of these modular tactics with state and civil attributes, exempting some local 
deviations, generates a reasonably predictable sequence of events, as summarised by 
Tudoroiu (2007, p336): 
 
1. a fraudulent national election; 
2. efficient independent monitoring and rapid publicizing of the fraud;  
3. opposition‟s decision to protest against electoral fraud without questioning the 
country‟s political and constitutional frameworks;  
4. opposition‟s success in mobilizing large numbers of citizens (the opposition was well 
organized but not necessarily united, at least in the early phases of the protest);  
5. regime‟s denial of the fraud and decision to impose official electoral results;  
6. a division within the regime‟s repressive apparatus preventing mass violence;  
7. massive protest demonstrations forcing the regime‟s leader to acknowledge his defeat;  
8. installation of a new, „revolutionary‟ national leadership, reinforced by quickly 
organized complementary elections;  
9. new leaders‟ claim to build democracy, promote reform, and fight corruption 
accompanied by arbitrary actions against some members of the former regime 
(usually under charges of corruption);  
10. increasingly visible survival of previous regime‟s non-democratic pattern? 
 
The initiation or progression to a certain point of the aforementioned process does not 
guarantee the success of a colour revolution. Nor does the success of these groups 
automatically lead them to accede to power and install insurmountable safeguards for a newly 
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generated or restored democracy. For example, the original colour revolutionary group, 
Otpor!, obtained only 1.6% of the total vote when it was transformed into a parliamentary 
party in 2003. This excluded it from any seats in the Serbian parliament (the minimum pre-
requisite for party representation is 5%), subsequently leading it to be absorbed into the 
Serbian Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka). The Ukrainian group Pora! suffered a 
similar fate, with its party wing „Yellow Pora‟ attaining only 1.47% of the vote and no seats 
in the 2006 Ukrainian parliamentary elections. It was disbanded shortly afterward, with the 
majority being absorbed into the „Our Ukraine-People‟s Self-Defence Bloc‟ alliance.4 
Events in former Soviet States have also been mixed, the “second wave” of colour 
revolutions noted earlier failed to produce much success, and the legacies of the successful 
Rose, Orange and Tulip revolution have all been thrown into varying levels of doubt. 
Nevertheless, what defines and affects the success and failure of a colour revolution event is 
not a clear cut or singularly definitive concept. The specificity and nuances of such 
judgements and how they can be made are covered in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion: A framework for understanding mass civil mobilisation in post-Soviet 
Eurasia 
This section has outlined the causes and processes that underpin a colour revolution or similar 
event in post-Soviet Eurasia. The nature of a colour revolution as a “non-revolutionary 
revolution” indicates that the analytical tools used for classifying, categorising and tracking 
classical examples of revolutions are insufficient or inappropriate for application to recent 
events in Russia and its post-Soviet neighbours. As such, this analysis has generated a hybrid 
framework for determining whether a country possesses the necessary state and civil 
                                                 
4
 Party data is available from the Ukrainian Centre for Political Information: 
 http://da-ta.com.ua/mon_mainnews/916.htm 
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attributes to allow for an instance of mass-based, elite-inspired governmental rotation 
following the colour revolution model. This model will be applied in subsequent chapters, 
and will form a part of the wider analysis of the ongoing instance of mass civil mobilisation 
in the Russian Federation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Measuring the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of colour revolutions  
_____________________________ 
 
 
The colour revolution phenomenon is often divided into two periods or phases. The „first 
generation‟ of revolutions (2000-2005) produced the „successful‟ White, Rose, Orange and 
Tulip revolutions. At the very least, these instances were effective in ousting incumbent semi-
autocratic regimes and generating a democratic breakthrough within their respective nation 
states (D'Anieri, 2006, Kuzio, 2008, Simecka, 2009). The „second wave‟ (2005-2009) of 
attempted colour revolutions in the post-Soviet states of Azerbaijan, Russia, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus produced no notable successes (Korosteleva, 2012, p38).  
 One interpretation of this discrepancy is that the remaining authoritarian regimes in 
the region, through their own form of learning and autocratic „regional diffusion,‟ have 
learned how to prevent the successful outcome of a colour revolution or similar form of mass 
civil action. In this scenario, the cadré of regional ruling autocrats or semi-authoritarians 
effectively „caught up‟ to the tactics employed by the „colour forces‟ sometime during the 
intersecting period between generations (2005-2006), and subsequently internalised and 
employed techniques that effectively prevent or critically beleaguer the successful outcome 
of colour revolutions (Finkel and Brudny, 2012a, pp8-9). While the element of authoritarian 
learning is a significant explanatory factor, it is important not to neglect that colour 
revolution events possessed a significant internal basis to which external elements of support 
and opposition, such as elements of democratic diffusion, attached themselves. It is also 
notable that the „first generation‟ of colour revolutions featured approximately as many 
unsuccessful instances as successful ones, and those successful instances were often preceded 
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by at least one significant but failed prior attempt (D'Anieri, 2006, p339). 
 With these facts taken into account, the question of what defines the „success‟ and 
„failure‟ of a colour revolution becomes critical. It is important to separate the ostensible 
claims and rhetoric of all actors from their real-world outcomes, desired or otherwise. Under 
scrutiny,  the claim made by the revolutionaries and their supporters, that the ultimate 
outcome of this type of mass civil mobilisation event is a popular people‟s revolution that 
installs a western-style liberal democracy from below, does not represent the outcomes of 
these efforts to date (Finkel and Brudny, 2012a, Hale, 2006, Lane, 2008, Lane, 2009, 
Tudoroiu, 2007). Likewise, the oft-made claim by ruling regional autocrats, aspiring or 
otherwise, that they are taking „necessary‟ repressive measures in order to prevent a foreign 
coup d‟etat attempt formulated by the United States and/or its NATO allies does not represent 
a realistic assessment, given that the overwhelming source of the support for these 
movements are typically elites native to the state in question (D'Anieri, 2006, Hale, 2005, 
Lane, 2009, Tudoroiu, 2007). That is not to say that these sentiments do not have some 
grounding in the realities of colour revolutions. It is no secret that Western governments and 
institutions have, since the end of the Cold War, supported „pro-democratic‟ forces via 
NGO‟s and other groups throughout much of post-Soviet Eurasia (Obydenkova, 2012, 
Wilson, 2006). However, the notion that the West can use its own transplanted or regionally 
native NGO‟s as proxies for the overthrow of popular governments is a questionable one 
(Wilson, 2006, p31). Additionally, although the outcomes of the „successful‟ colour 
revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan have been less than a Western-style liberal 
democratic ideal they did, at least temporarily, encourage a pro-democratic trend within these 
states (Kuzio, 2008). 
 Following on from such debates, this section firstly reviews and analyses what 
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determines the „success‟ or „failure‟ of a colour revolution event, and how such judgements 
can be made. Secondly, the methods and significance of the preventative strategies „learned‟ 
and employed by semi-autocratic governments in the region via „autocratic diffusion‟ 
(Korosteleva, 2012, p38) are examined and scrutinised. Both elements are subsequently 
complemented by an analysis of democratic development precedents and trajectories in the 
post-Soviet Eurasia region.  
 
Revolutionary success and failure contextualised within post-Soviet Eurasia 
Conditions for the „success‟ or „failure‟ of a colour revolution are difficult to segregate from 
the theoretical framework and academic assumptions that underpin their analysis. As noted in 
the preceding chapter, the immediate determinant of  whether a colour revolution event grows 
or fails is the „tipping point‟ mechanism and its constituent and contributing factors 
(D'Anieri, 2006, p334). From this basis, it needs to be determined what the results of this 
success or failure are, as it is their short- and long-term legacies that ultimately imbue colour 
revolutions with significance and meaning. Regional trends have shown that even a „failed‟ 
instance can create conditions for a success later on (D'Anieri, 2006, p339). Conversely a 
„successful‟ event can still be tarnished by a  legacy of shortfall or failure (Tudoroiu, 2007, 
p316). These represent the two dynamics by which the colour revolutions enact change; 
replacement of the ruling elite, and the typically subsequent reform of the state and of the 
political system. Returning to Ash‟s typology, colour revolutions become a combination of a 
„revelection‟ and a „refolution.‟   
 There are two methods by which to judge the outcomes of colour revolutions. The 
first is to benchmark the purported aims of these events against their actual results (i.e. 
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measuring the success of the reform dynamic). The second is to implicitly acknowledge the 
distinction between their underlying rhetoric and confirmed outcomes, namely that the typical 
and inevitable outcome of „successful‟ events is elite rotation (i.e. measuring the success of 
the replacement dynamic). These two methods of benchmarking colour revolutions are not 
conflicting, and are complementary if it is acknowledged that each operates to a different 
time scale and frame of analysis, as replacement and reform do.  
 Elite replacement is the most evident indicator that an instance of colour revolution or 
Eurasian mass civil mobilisation has succeeded in its immediate and implicit aim (D'Anieri, 
2006, p336 , Lane, 2009, p118). In the cases of Serbia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, the 
incumbent leaderships, as embodied by their leaders Slobadan Milošević, Eduard 
Shevardnadze and Askar Akayev respectively, were replaced by a new combination of elites 
who were, at least ostensibly, more facilitating toward democratic processes and ideals. In 
Ukraine, the favoured candidate of departing and highly unpopular President Leonid Kuchma 
was not elected after the Orange protesters forced a fair re-run of elections. As post-Soviet 
states are generally presidential or semi-presidential political systems, elite rotation can be 
evidenced by changes in positions of power such as the presidency, prime-ministership and 
other key government posts. 
 Unlike the largely self-evident process of elite transition, the effects of medium- and 
longer-term democratic reforms at the national political and societal level are less tangible, 
and thus more reliant on hybridised subjective/objective index-type measures. Time-line and 
index data measuring democratic governance is available from the annual Freedom House 
Freedom of the World publication, which is based on an assessment of political rights 
(electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government) and civil 
liberties (freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of 
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law, personal autonomy and individual rights) on a seven point scale, ascending from „most 
free‟ to „least free.‟ The most recent report (Freedom House, 2012a) classifies Ukraine as 
“partly free” (PR4, CL3), Georgia as “partly free” (PR4, CL3), Kyrgyzstan as “partly free” 
(PR5, CL5) and Russia as “not free” (PR6, CL5). This shows that these states (excluding 
Russia) have lost some of the democratic gains they made through their colour revolutions, 
though not all. In the year preceding their respective colour revolutions Ukraine was 
classified as “partly free” (PR4, CL4 in 2003), Georgia as “partly free” (PR4, CL4 in 2002) 
and Kyrgyzstan as “not free” (PR6, CL5 in 2004). Allowing two years for a „refolution‟ to 
take place, all these states had made notable gains in democratic and civil development with 
Ukraine classified as “free” (PR3, CL2 in 2006), Georgia as “partly free” (PR3, CL4 in 2005) 
and Kyrgyzstan as “partly free” (PR5, CL4 in 2007) (Freedom House, 2012b).  
 Attempts have also been made to correlate the intensity and success probability of 
Eurasian mass mobilisation events with economic measures, most notably gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita and the Gini income inequality coefficient. While economic 
grievances have been a contributing factor to the motivations and rhetoric of many anti-
autocratic protests and movements, attempts to establish a direct correlation between the  
absolute or relative values of these economic figures and revolutionary occurrence, success 
and intensity have proven to be weak or inconclusive (Lane, 2009, pp125-126). Of great 
significance however, is the role of economic variables in shaping social conditions, such as 
contributing to the grievances of dissenting groups and the formation of a middle class.    
 „Indices of freedom‟ possess relevance not only by defining the pre- and post-
conditions of colour revolutions, but also by identifying underlying trends in democracy 
development across a cross-section of post-Soviet Eurasian states. Trend and static 
measurements can be used in congruence to demonstrate the degree of freedom and 
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authoritarianism a state system exhibits at any point in time, as well as the trajectory and 
magnitude of its movement in an authoritarian or democratic direction. This data and its 
derived implications will be utilised in subsequent sections, in conjunction with other 
frameworks and assessments.     
 
Authoritarian learning and counter-strategies 
Since their first generation, the colour revolutions have had a significant impact upon the 
political positions, decision making psyche and policy adaptations of the remaining post-
Soviet Eurasian semi-authoritarian regimes (Finkel and Brudny, 2012b, Korosteleva, 2012, 
Wilson, 2009). Much like the aforementioned modular nature of the colour revolutions, the 
responses adopted by various regional autocrats have also displayed characteristics of 
modularly and cross-border diffusion. In Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet 
states where serious attempts at mass-inspired elite rotation have either failed or not occurred 
altogether, this particular mix of preventative policies has come to be labelled as „anti-colour 
insurance‟ (Finkel and Brudny, 2012a, p2). The particular balance of „instruments‟ selected 
from the available repertoire of „anti-colour insurance‟ has, much like the tactics of pro-
democracy protesters and democratic revolutionary handbook, been adapted to fit national 
conditions and the specific needs as perceived by ruling autocrats. Factors that impact upon 
this particular mix include the perceived magnitude of the threat to regime survival, nuances 
of the national economy and political culture, and the relative strength of the incumbent vis-
a-vis pro-democracy groups (Finkel and Brudny, 2012a, p2). 
 The Orange Revolution in particular has been cited as the main impetus for the 
development of such policies, especially in the territorially adjacent and culturally related 
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post-Soviet states of Russia and Belarus (Wilson, 2009, p371). While there is evidence to 
suggest that many „anti-colour insurance‟ policies such as limiting the funding and freedom 
of NGO‟s, restriction and nationalisation of media outlets, and crackdowns on opposition 
figures, were spurred on by fears arising out of the Orange Revolution, some of the 
groundwork for such policies had been laid prior to the mass-civil mobilisation events in 
Ukraine. For example in May 2004, a full six months before the Orange Revolution, 
President Putin had argued that grants from influential foreign foundations had unduly 
influenced the functioning of many Russian NGO‟s (Finkel and Brudny, 2012b, Putin, 2004). 
In other post-Soviet states, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan, political development in an 
authoritarian trajectory had proceeded largely uninhibited since their national independence 
from the USSR (Freedom House, 2012b). As such, authoritarian responses have always 
featured in the various calculi of colour revolutions. Their tendency over time to become 
structured and identifiable is a departure from the reactive and on-the-fly responses of earlier 
aspiring autocrats such as Milošević and Shevardnadze, and can be more easily incorporated 
into the analytical structure of frameworks addressing elite rotation and mass civil 
mobilisation events in Eurasia. 
 „Autocratic diffusion‟ and authoritarian learning (Korosteleva, 2012, p38) can be most 
accurately conceived of as originating from two modes of transmission: formal and informal 
cooperation between semi-autocratic states, and independent learning from the successes and 
failures of similar regional regimes (parallel development). Regardless of the specifics of 
how a particular policy was learned or transferred, authoritarian regimes in the region have 
come to rely upon at least one type of policy from five policy forms or „streams:‟ isolation, 
marginalisation, distribution, repression and/or persuasion (Finkel and Brudny, 2012a, p6). 
 An authoritarian regime can isolate itself by limiting access to foreign NGO‟s, 
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denying visas to election observers and other „threat‟ officials, and restricting and censoring 
sources of external communication such as media outlets. Marginalisation of the opposition 
can be achieved via the tightening of election legislation such as electoral percentage 
thresholds, limiting the movements and media access of opposition figures, and adopting 
elements of negative propaganda against pro-democracy groups and activists. Distribution 
can be affected through rewarding and strengthening loyal groups, whilst attempting to bribe 
or buy off opposition forces. The regime can repress the opposition through legal and illegal 
(covert) instruments, such as show trials, imprisonment and „disappearances.‟ Finally it can 
also attempt to persuade the population through appeals to national unity and identity, casting 
democracy as alien to the national culture and by portraying pro-democracy and anti-
government groups as agents of undue and negatively-motivated foreign influence (Finkel 
and Brudny, 2012a). 
 These five strategic archetypes seek to negatively impact upon the pro-democratic 
arithmetic of the ten factors of revolutionary success enumerated in the first chapter. Related 
political and state devices have also, demonstrably, been utilised by the Putin/Medvedev 
Presidency prior and concurrent to the ongoing protest events in the Russian Federation 
(Finkel and Brudny, 2012b). The applicable features of these will be incorporated into the 
wider analysis of the Russian mass civil mobilisation in the third chapter.  
 
Democratic development trajectories in post-Soviet Eurasia 
Debates persist about the legacy and longer-term consequences of the colour revolutions 
(Hale, 2006, Kuzio, 2008, Lane, 2009, Tudoroiu, 2007). Also, the events in the Russian 
Federation are themselves ongoing in nature. Given these limitations, it is sufficient for now 
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to acknowledge three points or „lessons learned‟ through the experiences of the colour 
revolutions. First, these events have generated democratic trends of varying longevity, 
predominantly though not limited to the states that have experienced a „successful‟ colour 
revolution. Second, that current protest action in the Russian Federation is occurring in an 
environment that is arguably more oppressive than the conditions present in Ukraine and 
Georgia, though at a similar degree of political oppression as was present in Serbia and 
Kyrgyzstan during their respective colour revolutions (Freedom House, 2012b). And third, 
that many revolutionary attempts were preceded by failed prior attempts; the Orange and 
White Revolutions in particular were successors to similar but failed attempts of comparable 
size and aim (D'Anieri, 2006). 
 Overall, the colour revolutions have generated trends toward democratic development 
within the states in which they have occurred „successfully.‟ The long-term security of these 
democratic gains continue to be marked by uncertainty (Lane, 2009, Tudoroiu, 2007), 
especially as conditions in many states continue to oscillate toward and away from their 
original notable gains in democratic development. A time-series analysis of the Freedom in 
the World index supports this interpretation: 
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Figure 2.1 Time-series of Eurasian democracy, 1999-2012 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: Freedom House (2012b) 
 
  
 A broader understanding of the phenomenon would also note that it has inspired pro-
democracy activists and movements across much of post-Soviet Eurasia, even in countries 
where the original „modular‟ interpretation of colour revolutions is not ostensibly conducive 
to them, such as in Kyrgyzstan. From this perspective, the colour revolution phenomenon has 
induced a net-positive effect on Eurasian democracy, regardless of the success and failure of 
individual instances or attempts (Hale, 2006, p317). The example of Kyrgyzstan serves to 
evidence a second broader point, namely that the degree to which the incumbent is 
predisposed to use overtly belligerent and oppressive methods finds its strongest positive 
correlation with the predisposition toward violence of anti-incumbent groups, rather than the 
likelihood of revolutionary initiation or success. This point is corroborated by more recent 
colour revolution events, such as the attempted „Twitter‟ or „Grape‟ Revolution in Moldova 
(The Economist, 2009). As such, the Kyrgyz and Moldovan protests featured more violence 
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than the relatively non-violent Rose and Orange revolutions. (Kimmage, 2005, The Guardian, 
2005) 
 There is a strong case to be made that overtly belligerent attacks and ruthless 
oppression of NGO‟s and civil society by autocratic regimes in Eurasia may in-fact be having 
a self-attenuating effect on their political strength. The incumbent autocrat inadvertently 
generates this backlash as a by-product of utilising the oppressive measures noted in the 
preceding section. This happens either by increasingly destabilising the societal consensus 
and status quo upon which these policies are based, decreasing the perceived legitimacy and 
popularity of the incumbent, or by disrupting the cycle of democracy/autocracy that often 
allows such regimes a continued and popularly accepted existence (Dmitriev and Treisman, 
2012, Hale, 2006, p306, Myers, 2006, Wilson, 2009). A prudent analysis of current events in 
the Russian Federation must acknowledge these regional socio-political trends. 
 What is also clear from figure 2.1 is that in the current mixed-regime political 
environment of post-Soviet Eurasia, the particular degree of authoritarianism a state exhibits 
does not seem to correlate with the relative gains in democracy generated by a mass civil 
mobilisation event. The cases that featured the most (Serbia) and least (Kyrgyzstan) gains in 
democracy were also comparatively the most authoritarian states at the time of their 
respective colour revolutions.  
 Insofar as colour revolutions are „events‟ in their own right, the cycle of 
democracy/autocracy in the region also indicates that they can be viewed a democratic 
„peaks‟ in a national and/or regional oscillation. It is openly acknowledged by many Eurasian 
pro-democracy or anti-autocratic activists that they have to „lose before they can win.‟ Such 
sentiment was echoed by Alexander Milinkevich, a prominent opposition figure during the 
mass civil mobilisation against the 2006 elections in Belarus questionably won by incumbent 
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autocrat Alexander Lukashenko, who in hearkening back to Poland‟s anti-communist 
Solidarity movement noted: “The authorities could do nothing. Martial law was imposed. 
And that was the beginning of the end” (Myers, 2006). Milinkevich is not referring to the 
collapse of communism and triumph of Solidarity in 1989, but rather the seemingly hopeless 
days of 1980 during Lech Walesa‟s campaign of dissent. A survey of notable regional 
instances of mass civil mobilisation appears to uphold this thesis: 
Table 2.1 The colour revolutions summarised 
 
Year State Attributed Name Outcome 
1996-1997 Serbia - Unsuccessful 
2000 Serbia „Bulldozer or „White‟ Revolution Successful 
2001 Ukraine - Unsuccessful 
2003 Georgia Rose Revolution Successful 
2003 Azerbaijan - Unsuccessful 
2004 Ukraine „Orange‟ Revolution Successful 
2005 Kyrgyzstan „Tulip Revolution‟ Successful 
2005 Azerbaijan - Unsuccessful 
2005 Uzbekistan „Cotton Revolution‟ Unsuccessful 
2006 Belarus „Denim Revolution‟ Unsuccessful 
2009 Moldova „Grape‟ Revolution Unsuccessful 
 
Sources: D‟Anieri  (2006); Korosteleva (2009); The Economist (2009) 
 
 
Less significant attempts have been made across much of post-Soviet Eurasia, including in 
Russia and Kazakhstan where groups were inspired by the success of the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine (Korosteleva, 2012, p38). Thus, as a trend, an unsuccessful instance could be a 
momentum generator for more notable and/or successful events later on. Authoritarian 
oppression could thus simply be delaying the inevitable, or serving as an incubator that keeps 
down smaller and current movements, eventually allowing even larger and/or more 
successful movements emerge. Also, given the more significant costs associated with civil 
opposition to regimes willing to use belligerent and overtly oppressive measures, such as in 
Serbia or Russia, the existence of a significant anti-authoritarian movement may be even 
more suggestive of a larger (but for the time frightened into passivity) support base for such 
movements than in a state where oppression is less institutionalised, such a Georgia or 
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Ukraine. 
 
Conclusion: Defining the success and failure of colour revolutions 
This section has highlighted the oscillating and sometimes ambiguous nature of the colour 
revolutions. Of note has been how and on what basis the judgement of the „success‟ or 
„failure‟ of a colour revolution type event can be made, both in the shorter- and longer-terms. 
Also covered has been how the various oppressive tools and methods employed by post-
Soviet Eurasia‟s remaining autocrats have sought to impact the variables of the colour 
revolution calculus in their favour. Tracking the consequences of these oppressive methods 
within the context of present day Eurasia has shown that the most significant effect of these 
tactics has been to increase the predisposition of opposition groups toward violence, rather 
than impacting their emergence or success. Additionally highlighted has been the dualistic 
nature of colour revolutions, both as events in their own right and as „upward‟ markers in a 
longer trend progression of state attributes toward and away from democratic development. 
The lessons learned from previous cases of colour revolutions, as well as from their 
underlying regional trends, are essential to an informed analysis of the Russian protest events. 
In the Russian context, the underlying political and societal trends are the crucial variable, 
whether the aesthetic features of previous colour revolutions, such as naming and symbolism, 
are used or not. The Russian events in themselves should be treated as an indicator of the 
current state of democratic development in the post-Soviet Eurasia region. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Russia, Putin and the protesters 
_____________________________ 
 
The pro-democracy demonstrations in the Russian Federation are unprecedented not only due 
to their size, but also their demographic composition and the nature of their grievances. 
Large-scale protests are not unknown in Russia‟s recent history. Up to tens of thousands 
mobilised across Russia in 2005-2006 to protest a series of unpopular welfare and housing 
reforms (RFE/RL, 2012). Smaller protests featuring some of the groups participating in the 
current mass mobilisation, known collectively as the „Dissenters March(es),‟ took place in 
2007 (Stolyarova, 2012) with some activity continuing into 2008. Though communist, 
nationalist and liberal youth protesters (including Oborona) have featured in prior protests in 
Russia, it is the swelling of the current protest action ranks by the younger, urban middle 
class that has particularly distinguished these demonstrations from earlier such examples in 
Russia. This group has also come to form the protests‟ leading element (Kramer, 2011). Such 
demographic changes bring these demonstrations in-line with previous events in Serbia, 
Georgia and Ukraine, among others. Additionally, the somewhat abstract demands made by 
the protesters, such as fairness and democracy, stand in contrast with the more tangible and 
material grievances that have underpinned previous large-scale protest actions in the country.  
 Given the generally negative Russian perceptions of the colour revolutions, even 
among the youth (Kuzio, 2006, Mendelson and Gerber, 2005), some of the groups which 
currently make up the anti-government protests have either purposefully or incidentally 
chosen not to overtly associate themselves with the language and symbolism of the colour 
revolutions. Nevertheless, a large „anti-Orange‟ demonstration has been held in addition to 
pro-government or pro-Putin counter-protests, led primarily by the Kremlin supported youth 
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group Nashi (meaning „our [people]‟ in Russian). These „anti-Orange‟ protesters ostensibly 
claim that they are for „fair elections‟ and some even for „a Russia without Putin,‟ but also 
oppose the occurrence of a colour revolution in Russia. Similar to earlier instances of colour 
revolutions, many participants in such pro-incumbent or anti-revolutionary demonstrations 
were incentivised to swell the ranks by promises of monetary reward, free food and popular 
entertainment (Barry and Kramer, 2012, PolitOnline, 2012).  
 In many respects, the Russian Federation forms the political, economic and historic 
core of post-Soviet Eurasia. As such these protests can be studied as an instance of Eurasian 
mass civil mobilisation or „colour revolution,‟ whether certain aesthetic trappings are 
employed by the opposition or not. As noted in Chapter One, one core feature of Eurasian 
mass mobilisation events is that they are not static in nature, and have generally found a 
nuanced and somewhat unique national expression derived from the state, civil and cultural 
attributes of the countries in which they take place. Likewise noted in Chapter One was the 
importance of the distance represented by time. The current Russian protests constitute the 
latest episode in the regional sequence of protest and dissent first begun by the 2000 
Bulldozer/White Revolution in Serbia and somewhat coincidently, the white ribbons worn by 
some Russian protesters have been the closest attribute to a „colour‟ the symbolism of these 
demonstrations has come to feature (Elder, 2011d). Given that the time elapsed from that 
event is now more than a decade, it seems intuitive that pro- and anti-incumbent groups in 
Russia would have internalised many of lessons accrued from previous „colour revolution‟ 
events in the region. Key Kremlin strategist and seminal theorist  of „sovereign democracy‟ 
Vladislav Surkov admitted as much at the end of 2011, noting that “the system has already 
changed” (Kramer, 2011). As such these protests can be used as a litmus to test the balance of 
the relationship between these two broad forces, both in Russia and in the Eurasia region 
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more broadly. 
 This section applies the frameworks and „lessons learned‟ outlined in the preceding 
chapters. The purpose is both to analyse the 2011-2012 Russian anti-incumbent protest 
actions in their own right, as well as contextualise them within broader Eurasian trends of 
democratic development and civil dissent. First evaluated are the current civil attributes of the 
Russian Federation, most notably the features of the protest group and the condition of the 
civil society under which it operates. This is followed by an attribute analysis of Russia‟s 
nominally independent and regionalised state, and government use of the authoritarian 
counter-strategies outlined in Chapter Two. The chapter concludes by summarising the 
attributes it has derived.  
 
The path to dissent: A history of the 2011-2012 Russian protests 
The 2011-2012 Russian protests were sparked by allegations of electoral fraud committed in 
the 2011 Russian legislative elections. Most of the alleged fraud was purportedly committed 
in favour of the incumbent party, United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya), the „party of power‟ 
(Kunov et al., 2005, Makarenko, 2011, p280) of the then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and 
then-President Dmitry Medvedev, who have since swapped roles following the 2012 Russian 
presidential election. As such, the leading figures and personalities of the party, most 
prominently Putin himself, have quickly become a focal point for much of the frustration and 
criticism levelled at the incumbency by the protesters. At stake in the legislative elections 
were all 450 seats in the Russian lower house, the Duma. United Russia‟s popular vote 
declined in these elections by 14.98%, decreasing party representation in the Duma from 315 
to 238, a net loss of 77 seats. Nevertheless, accusations of wide-spread electoral fraud 
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persisted, resulting in the first major anti-Putin protest on December 10 at Bolotnaya Square. 
The primary organising element of these protests was a Facebook event titled „Saturday at 
Bolotnaya Square‟ (Subota na Bolotnoi Ploshadi), which by December 8 had attracted more 
than 30,000 stated as „attending‟ (Herszenhorn and Barry, 2011). As with all the anti-
incumbent protests to date, obtaining an impartial and accurate estimate of protester numbers 
on the day is difficult, Moscow police reported an attendance of approximately 25,000, while 
protest organisers claimed a peak participation of 50,000-60,000 (Barry, 2011a).  
 The Bolotnaya protests had grown around an initial core of organisers critical of the 
Putin presidency and the monopolisation of the electoral system by United Russia. Leading 
figures of these initial protests included prominent politician and Putin critic Boris Nemtsov, 
who had variously served in the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian 
parliament) and as an adviser to Orange Revolution leader Viktor Yushchenko, and 
prominent political activist Alexey Navalny, whose anti-corruption oriented blog posts and 
famous denunciation of United Russia as the „party of crooks and thieves‟ has earned him 
credit from many for sparking the initial mass of the protest movement (Barry, 2011b, Elder, 
2011a). These protests took place after election day, on December 5, and continued on for 
two days, attracting approximately 5,000 participants at their peak. Given their immediacy, it 
seems appropriate to label these actions as the „core‟ of the initial protest mass. 
 Several larger and smaller protests have taken place since Nemtsov and Navalny‟s 
initial demonstrations and „Saturday at Bolotnaya Square.‟ The two largest occurred under 
the „For Fair Elections‟ label. The first was held on 24 December 2011 with approximately 
80,000 people in attendance at Moscow‟s Academician Sakharov Avenue. As with Saturday 
at Bolotnaya Square, estimates of attendance made by police and organisers seemed to 
conflict with reports made by more impartial observers. Police turnout estimates put the 
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number of demonstrators at approximately 28,000, while organisers claimed up to 120,000 in 
attendance. The second „For Fair Elections‟ protest brought 120,000 demonstrators back to 
Bolotnaya Square on 4 February 2012. Police claimed a highly deflated figure of 38,000, 
while organisers put forward the somewhat overestimated number of 160,000. In addition to 
Navalny and Nemtsov, the list of prominent speakers at these rallies included: 
 
● Gennady Gudkov - Political figure and member of the A Just Russia party. 
● Garry Kasparov - Public figure, political activist and former World Chess Champion. 
● Mikhail Kasyanov - Former Prime Minister under Putin and a leader of Russia‟s 
liberal opposition. 
● Alexie Kudrin - Finance minister of Russia under Putin and Medvedev, 2000-2011. 
Asked to resign by Medvedev in 2011. 
● Kseniya Sobchak - Prominent Russian socialite and daughter of Putin‟s political 
mentor, former Saint Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. 
● Sergei Udaltsov - Prominent political activist and leader of the Left Front movement, 
who has since become a leading figure in the anti-Putin protests.  
● Grigory Yavlinsky - Liberal politician, former Deputy Chairman of the council of 
ministers of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) and leader of 
the Yabloko party. 
 
 Overall the rallies featured prominent speakers from a cross-section of Russian 
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society including activists, politicians, journalists, writers, scientists and musicians. Former 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent his support to the December 24 rally. Also among 
the crowd was presidential candidate and oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov, though he did not 
speak. 
 Moscow has featured as the predominant focus of the anti-Putin protests. 
Nevertheless, smaller parallel protests have taken place in conjunction with the main 
demonstrations in the capital. For example, „Saturday at Bolotnaya Square‟ was billed to 
feature parallel demonstrations in 88 Russian towns and cities. Though an overly-ambitious 
target, significant protests were recorded in many Russian cities including St. Petersburg, 
Nizhny Novgorod, Yekaterinburg, Vladivostok, Kazan, Omsk, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, 
Kaliningrad, Novosibirsk, Khabarovsk, Tomsk, Kazan, Perm, Kurgan, Kazan and 
Krasnoyarsk. A summary of notable anti-incumbent protests to date is given in Table 3.1, 
these figures are not inclusive of protester numbers outside of Moscow.  
Table 3.1 Summary of all major pro-democracy or anti-incumbent protests to date 
 
Name Date 
Attendance 
(per police) 
Attendance 
(per organisers) 
Attendance (per 
other sources) 
Venue (maximum 
capacity) 
- 
5-7 
December, 
2011 
- - 5,000
5
 
N/A (various 
venues across 
Moscow)
5
 
„Saturday at 
Bolotnaya 
Square 
10 December, 
2011 
25,000
6
 50,000
6
  
30,000 - 
60,000
10
 
Bolotnaya Square 
(101,000)
7
 
                                                 
5
 ELDER, M. 2011c. Russian police and troops clash with protesters in Moscow [Online]. The Guardian. 
Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/06/russian-police-troops-moscow-protest [Accessed 12 
June 2012]. 
6
 ELDER, M. 2011b. Rally Defying Putin‟s Party Draws Tens of Thousands [Online]. The Guardian. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-in-moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-
putin.html?scp=1&sq=thousands&_r=0 [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
7
 RIAN. 2011c. Сколько человек может вместить проспект Сахарова в Москве [Online]. RIA-Novosti. 
Available: http://ria.ru/infografika/20111223/524373513.html [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
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- 
17-18 
December, 
2011 
1,500
8
 - 5,000
8
 
Bolotnaya Square 
(101,000)
7
 
„For Fair 
Elections‟ 
24 December, 
2011 
28,000
9
 120,000
10
 80,000
10
 
Academician 
Sakharov Avenue 
(96,000)
11
 
„For Fair 
Elections‟ 
4 February, 
2012 
38,000
12
 160,000
12
 120,000
12
 
Bolotnaya Square 
(101,000)
7
 
„Big White 
Circle‟ 
26 February, 
2012 
- - 30,000
13
 
The Garden Ring 
(?) 
„For Fair 
Elections‟ 
10 March, 
2012 
10,000
14
 25,000
14
 - 
Novy Arbat Street 
(?) 
„March of 
Millions‟ 
6-7 May, 
2012 
- - 20,000+
15
 
N/A (various 
venues across 
Moscow) 
„March of 
Millions‟ 
12 June, 2012 15,000
16
 50,000
16
 - Pushkin Square (?) 
„Russia 
Without Putin‟ 
15 
September, 
2012 
- - 50,000+
17
 
N/A (various 
venues across 
Moscow) 
      
 
 
                                                 
8
 GAZETA. 2011a. Митинг Яблока за честные выборы на Болотной закончился, очевидцы говорят о 5 
тысячах участников [Online]. Available: http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/12/17/n_2138378.shtml 
[Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
9
 THE HUFFINGTON POST. 2011. Thousands Protest In Moscow Against Election Fraud [Online]. Available: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/12/24/thousands-protest-in-moscow_n_1168659.html?ref=uk [Accessed 
12 June 2012]. 
10
 BRATERSKY, A. & KRAINOVA, N. 2011. Rally Suggests Protest Mood Is Growing [Online]. The Moscow 
Times. Available: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/rally-suggests-protest-mood-is-
growing/450414.html [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
11
 RIAN. 2011b. Сколько человек может вместить проспект Сахарова в Москве [Online]. RIA-Novosti. 
Available: http://ria.ru/infografika/20111223/524373513.html [Accessed 17 August 2012]. 
12
 GAZETA. 2012. Митинг За честные выборы на Болотной площади закончился: 120 тысяч, следующий 
будет 26 февраля [Online]. Available: http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lastnews/2012/02/04/n_2191809.shtml 
[Accessed 17 October 2012]. 
13
 AMOS, H. & SAWER, P. 2011. Russian protests: December 10 as it happened [Online]. The Telegraph. 
Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8947840/Russian-protests-live.html 
[Accessed 14 June 2012]. 
14
 LENTA. 2012a. Митинг "За честные выборы" на Новом Арбате завершился [Online]. Available: 
http://lenta.ru/news/2012/03/10/over/ [Accessed 17 August 2012]. 
15
 BARRY, E., SCHWIRTZ, M., KATES, G. & TIKHOMIROVA, A. 2012. Arrests and Violence at 
Overflowing Rally in Moscow [Online]. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/world/europe/at-moscow-rally-arrests-and-violence.html [Accessed 7 
September 2012]. 
16
 THE GUARDIAN. 2012. Russians turn out in their thousands to protest against Vladimir Putin [Online]. 
Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/12/russians-thousands-protest-vladimir-putin [Accessed 
17 August 2012]. 
17
 GRANI.RU. 2012. Мэрия согласовала "Марш миллионов" 15 сентября [Online]. Available: 
http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/activism/m.206257.html [Accessed 17 September 2012]. 
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Pro-Putin and ‘anti-Orange’ demonstrations 
Several rallies have also been staged in support of the incumbency, mostly as a response to 
the pro-democracy and anti-Putin protesters. The early examples of these rallies occurred on 
4, 6 and 12 December 2011, and were organised by the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi 
(Sulimina, 2012). Attendance was smaller than the rival pro-democracy protests, with a 
recorded peak of approximately 15,000 attendees on 4 December. Outside observers reported 
that some demonstrators were seemingly forced to attend (Schwirtz, 2011). As these rallies 
already drew upon the regions for many of their participants, there were no examples of such 
demonstrations outside Moscow (Sulimina, 2012).  
 The Nashi protests were followed by two larger demonstrations. The first on 4 
February 2012, titled the „Anti-Orange Protest,‟ was ostensibly a demonstration against a 
possible colour revolution in Russia. Police reported the inflated attendance figure of 
138,000-150,000, while outside observers, including the Russian state‟s own media channel 
RIA-Novosti reported the real figure to be „much lower‟ (Oliphant, 2012). Additionally, the 
protesters were reportedly incentivised by the promise of monetary reward, free food and 
popular entertainment (Barry and Kramer, 2012, PolitOnline, 2012). Such tactics are 
reminiscent of events in earlier colour revolutions. For example, similar incentives were used 
by the incumbent pro-Yanukovych Party of Regions during the Orange Revolution, in order 
to draw its „supporters‟ to the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. In some cases participants were 
reportedly coerced by threats of firings and job-loss, though this was denied by pro-
government media sources (PolitOnline, 2012). Regardless of over-estimates and 
inaccuracies, this protest demonstrated that Putin does have a support base and popularity 
among Russians. Putin himself admitted as much on both points, telling an interviewer from 
the Interfax news agency that while some demonstrators may have been forced to attend by 
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their employers, administrative pressure alone could not have gathered such a quantity of 
people (Barry and Kramer, 2012). The demographic base of the „anti-Orange‟ rally was 
generally older and more working class relative to the pro-democracy demonstrators. Primary 
attendees included state employees, the Patriots of Russia Party, the Trade Union of Russian 
Citizens, the Pensioners Union of Russia and the Russian Union of Afghanistan Veterans. 
 The Defender of the Fatherland Rally on 23 February 2012 possessed many 
similarities with the anti-Orange Protest. The key speaker was Vladimir Putin himself, who 
gave a highly patriotic speech denouncing the influence of outsiders and their domestic 
agents, presumably a reference to NGO‟s and the pro-democracy protests. As with the 
previous event, some participants at this rally were reportedly forced to attend by their 
employers, while some younger participants noted that they had been paid to attend and were 
told that they were going to a „folk festival‟ (BBC, 2012a). No significant parallel rallies 
were recorded in other Russian cities.  A summary of notable anti-incumbent protests to date 
is given in Table 3.2. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Summary of all major pro-incumbent or anti-orange protests to date 
 
 
Name Date 
Attendance 
(per police) 
Attendance 
(per 
organisers) 
Attendance 
(per other 
sources) 
Venue (maximum 
capacity) 
- 
4 December, 
2011 
- - 15,000
18
 
Revolution Square, 
Manezhnaya 
Square 
- 
6 December, 
2011 
- - 5,000
18
 
Manezhnaya 
Square, 
Triumfalnaya 
Square 
                                                 
18
 SULIMINA, A. 2012. The empire strikes back [Online]. The Moscow News. Available: 
http://www.themoscownews.com/politics/20111208/189271247.html [Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
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Constitution Day 
Rally 
12 
December, 
2011 
- - “thousands”18 
N/A (various 
venues across 
Moscow) 
„Anti-Orange 
Protest‟ 
4 February, 
2012 
138,000 – 
150,000
19
 
- 
“much lower” 
(than 138,000)
19
 
Poklonnaya Hill 
(193,000)
20
 
„Defender of the 
Fatherland Day‟ 
Rally 
23 February, 
2012 
130,000
21
 - - Luzhniki Stadium 
 
 
 
Extent of electoral fraud 
The true extent of the electoral fraud committed in the 2011 legislative elections is difficult to 
gauge. No independent exit polls were conducted concurrent with the elections. The final 
outcome was, however, broadly consistent with the pre-election opinion polling conducted 
both by the independent Levada Center and the state-owned All-Russian Center for the Study 
of Public Opinion (VTsIOM or VCIOM). Some results were evidently fraudulent, such as the 
99.48% vote United Russia obtained in the Chechen Republic (RIAN, 2011a, Grove, 2011). 
Similarly untenable results of over 90% for United Russia were reported in the neighbouring 
North Caucus Republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia (Grove, 2011). 
 The State Central Election Commission, headed by Vladimir Churov claimed it had 
investigated 1686 reports of voting irregularities, of which it said only 195 (11.5%) 
constituted true and genuine reports of fraud (Lenta, 2012b). The incumbency chose to 
support this position, with Putin‟s press secretary Dmitry Peskov declaring that the combined 
                                                 
19
 OLIPHANT, R. 2012. Anti-Putin protests return to Moscow's freezing streets [Online]. The Telegraph. 
Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/9061502/Anti-Putin-protests-return-to-
Moscows-freezing-streets.html [Accessed 11 August 2012]. 
20
 RIAN. 2012b. Сколько человек вмещает Поклонная гора [Online]. RIA-Novosti. Available: 
http://www.ria.ru/infografika/20120203/555840256.html [Accessed 9 September 2012]. 
21
 BBC. 2012a. Putin tells stadium rally 'battle' is on for Russia [Online]. British Broadcasting Corporation. 
Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17136644 [Accessed 25 August 2012]. 
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effect of all falsifications could not have impacted the vote by more than 0.5% (Forbes.ru, 
2011b). Comprehensive statistical analyses applied to the election data hints that the official 
position is understated (Shpilkin, 2011). The most peculiar feature of the United Russia vote 
is its non-Gaussian (i.e. not a „bell curve‟) distribution, which is an extremely unusual 
electoral profile, even more so as the vote profiles of all other parties in the election tended to 
conform to this distributive rule. The second irregularity seems to be that the United Russia 
vote „peaks‟ at multiples of five in booths where votes for the party exceeded 50% of the total 
votes cast, indicating that a component of the party‟s vote was planned “from above” to 
deliver a certain result (e.g. 60% for United Russia or 75% for United Russia). A third is that 
turnout seems to be overly high, especially in booths with high percentage returns for United 
Russia, though this is less verifiable as it can partially be explained by the existence of 
„electoral enclaves‟ (PolitOnline, 2011). A graphical representation of all three trends as 
derived from electoral data is given in figure 3.1 
Figure 3.1 Graphical representation of share of party vote experienced at a certain quantity of polling booths  
 
Source: Shpilkin (2011) 
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This analysis confirms the claims made by independent observers on election day of carousel 
voting, purposeful mis-reporting of vote counts by election officials and ballot stuffing (Echo, 
2011, Forbes.ru, 2011a, Gazeta, 2011b). These observations were also backed up by the 
statement of preliminary findings and conclusions gathered by the Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Among other things the report noted the election was 
“slanted in favour of the ruling party as evidenced by the lack of independence of the election 
administration, the partiality of most media, and the undue interference of state authorities at 
different levels,” concluding that these facts on the ground did not provide the “necessary 
conditions for fair electoral competition” (OSCE, 2011, p1). 
 Thus we can conclude with some confidence that electoral fraud did occur in the 2011 
Russian legislative elections, in some cases on an extensive basis. What is more difficult to 
ascertain is whether the level of electoral fraud was sufficient to significantly affect the final 
outcome. Returning to the statistical analysis conducted by Shpilkin, even if the vote for 
United Russia is adjusted to its hypothetical „no fraud‟ Gaussian distribution, it still remains 
the most dominant party in the election (Shpilkin, 2011). The results of this maximum „de-
frauding‟ are summarised in table 3.3. As can be further noted, even in these circumstances, 
no party outside the four already elected to the Duma manages to breach the minimum 
electoral threshold.  
 To some extent these observations return us to the colour revolutions. As is hinted at 
in the OSCE report, the electoral fraud is in itself only a „smoking gun,‟ while the underlying 
motivator of the dissenting parties could be put down to the state and civil attributes that led 
to this fraud being underreported and passively accepted by Russian society in the first place. 
In this case, the oppositions‟ most evident underlying grievance is with the political 
environment in which these elections are conducted (and rigged) and with the system of 
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government that administers them. Both are perceived as biased and unfair from inception, 
with President Putin serving as a figurehead and focal point for criticism. Also, as with earlier 
instances of mass civil mobilisation in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, what may be more 
important is not so much the mathematical extent of the fraud, but the public perception of 
electoral fraud itself, and feelings of mistrust, humiliation and betrayal it fosters within the 
popular conscience, especially within the newly (re-)established and growing middle class. 
The subsequent sections explore the dynamics of these state and civil attributes. 
Table 3.3 Results of the 2011 Russian legislative election, and adjusted figures removing vote fraud 
 
Party Electoral Result Adjusted Result 
A Just Russia 13.24% 17.69% 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 19.19% 25.63% 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 11.67% 15.60% 
Patriots of Russia 0.97% 1.30% 
Right Cause 0.60% 0.80% 
United Russia 49.32% 34.43% 
Yabloko 3.43% 4.56% 
 
Source: Shpilkin (2011) 
 
 
Analysis: Civil Attributes 
At street level, the composition of the Russian opposition movement can appear to be ad-hoc 
and politically unnatural. A broad survey of protester demographics reveals the participation 
of communists, far-right nationalists, far-left social democrats as well as more niche groups 
such as environmental and minority rights activists. Vladimir Putin has derided the 
demonstrators as “leaderless,” and compared their lack of ideological unity to a “Brownian 
motion,” each component going its own way (Zaks, 2011).  Yet as noted earlier, it has been 
the en masse participation of the urban middle class that distinguishes these protests from 
previous similar instances in the Russian Federation. Their participation has instilled a 
moderate tone into the demonstrations and swelled protester numbers into the tens and 
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hundreds of thousands. This political awakening of the nascent middle class reflects a 
significant, though gradual, shift in the socio-economic fabric of Russian society. 
 Putin‟s argument is certainly tenable. In the minds of many, political groupings such 
as communists and far-right nationalists are not easily reconciled as committed democrats. 
However, to say that these groups have no unifying element may be missing the point. For 
the most part, the protesters in their various guises represent political and social groupings 
that have in a sense been „crowded out‟ of the system by United Russia‟s electoral and 
governmental monopoly. This in itself is a powerful unifying factor. If nothing else, many of 
these groups hold the perception that they would achieve better outcomes under a genuinely 
fair and democratic environment. The variety of the dissenter‟s composition in many ways 
reflects the diversity of Russia‟s nascent civil society, and of any civil society. It is not 
necessarily a weakness in the goal of removing the incumbent regime, though may prove to 
be less workable in a hypothetical „after the fact‟ scenario. Nevertheless, in their first meeting 
at Bolotnaya Square, these seemingly disparate groups did manage to produce a unified set of 
demands by which to hold the incumbency to account (The Guardian, 2011): 
1. Freedom for political prisoners 
2. Annulment of the (legislative) election results 
3. The resignation of Vladimir Churov, head of the election commission and official 
investigation of vote fraud 
4. Registration of the opposition political parties and new democratic legislation on 
parties and elections  
5. New democratic and open elections 
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 It can hence be noted that the Russian political system is becoming increasingly 
contradictory to the aspirations and interests of the most politically engaged sections of 
society. Taking the most significant component, the urban middle class, as an example, its list 
of grievances include: dissatisfaction with the lack of social mobility, bureaucratic and police 
pressure on the private sector, lack of opportunity to influence the „political machine,‟ and the 
archaic form of communication between state and society. In the Russian scenario this 
amounts to what could be regarded as a “nonpartisan protest” (Makarenko, 2011, p289). That 
is not to say that the protest movement is completely decoupled from the party system, many 
participants are active politicians, some even sitting deputies in the Duma. Rather, it is that 
the short-term goals of the pro-democracy movement are such that while extensive 
parliamentary representation would be a boon, it is not a necessity (and at this point, 
possibility). Unfounded also are stereotypes of the protesters as a financially privileged upper 
class who, after a symbolic discharge of their civic duty retreat “into their lavish apartments, 
Jeeps, and Land Cruisers, departing on shopping trips to London and Paris, and embarking on 
expeditions to the Brazilian rainforest or on South African safaris” (Aron, 2012, pp1-2). 
Instead surveys reveal a much more humble demographic with only twenty-eight percent 
being able to buy a car, forty percent being able to buy some expensive things (i.e. a 
television and refrigerator) but not a car, twenty percent having only enough money for food 
and clothing, and the remainder having issues obtaining money even for those things (Aron, 
2012, p2) 
 Thus what has formed out of these civil attributes is a sort of „grey revolution,‟ a 
colour revolution devoid of a distinct colour. Noting that the protesters have already managed 
to extract some (albeit tokenistic) concessions from the incumbency, their inability to 
coalesce around a particular colour seems beside the point. As the colour revolutions have 
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tended to be conducted against a comparatively pro-Russian opponent, this has usually 
resulted in nationalists (those wishing to assert their national identity as distinct from the 
Russian domination experienced in Soviet times) and communists (those wishing to return to 
an idealised Soviet time, and thus the Russian sphere of influence) ending up on different 
sides of the power struggle. The dynamics of a similar situation in Russia must by their 
nature be different. As it is the dominant regional power, in the Russian scenario, nationalists, 
communists and the middle classes can present a unified front against the „party of power‟ 
without compromising their political legitimacy. There is no genuinely pro- or anti-Russian 
side to take. Also given the lack of electoral success organisations such as „Otpor!‟ and 
„Pora!‟ attracted once they were converted into a political party form, and the experiences of 
the Rose and Tulip revolutions, the degree of pluralism inherent within the political system 
does not appear to be a prime variable at this nascent stage of the pro-democracy movement. 
 So then are the current socio-political convulsions a case of Russian society 
distancing itself from the regime, or is the regime isolating itself from society by resorting to 
increasingly oppressive measures? This trend could be said to exhibit some bi-directionality, 
especially in light of recent attempts by the Kremlin to crack down on visible displays of 
dissent, but the former explanation does appear to be the overriding one. Polling carried out 
by the Levada Center helps to demonstrate such underlying changes in the dynamic Russian 
society, a society that is arguably changing faster than its government.  For example, in 2001, 
34% of Russian said they supported the concept of „one strong ruling party,‟ by the end of the 
decade this proportion had halved to 17%. Conversely support for a pluralistic system, with 
„two or three big parties‟ or more „relatively small parties‟ rose from 45% to 68%. These 
trends are demonstrated in table 3.4, figures are in percent 
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Table 3.4 Survey question: “How many political parties are necessary in Russia today?” 
 
 
Sept. 
2001 
Apr. 
2004 
Sept. 
2004 
Oct. 
2005 
July 
2006 
Apr. 
2007 
June 
2008 
Oct. 
2009 
One strong ruling 
party 
34 34 34 38 32 30 32 17 
Two or three big 
parties 
41 41 44 39 42 46 45 59 
Many relatively 
small parties 
4 8 6 4 5 7 8 9 
In general, we do not 
need political parties 
9 7 6 7 7 6 6 4 
It is difficult to 
answer 
13 11 9 12 14 13 10 11 
 
Source: Makarenko (2011) 
  
  
Russian society can thus be said to be moving toward a more democratic outlook at a 
moderate pace, though only a small proportion have thus far taken their grievances to the 
street. Taken on its own, the middle class stratum is the most open in its cynicism toward the 
political sphere and lack of belief in the bureaucracy‟s ability to listen and actuate their 
aspirations. By their own admission, members of United Russia are experiencing increasingly 
serious difficulties communicating with this group of people (Makarenko, 2011, p289-290). 
Yet, as a class, this group of people is likely to keep increasing as a proportion of the overall 
population as Russia continues to develop economically. Longer-term prospects certainly 
exist. 
 
Where is the tipping point? 
Just as in the Orange Revolution several years earlier, the concept of a tipping point resonates 
within the collective psyche of the current opposition movement, and has done almost from 
its moment of genesis. One of the central messages sent to potential participants prior to the 
Bolotnaya Square demonstrations was that “If 5,000 people go out on the street, they will be 
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dispersed; if 50,000 go out, the police will stand silently; and if 500,000 go out, then the 
police will take their side.” (Herszenhorn and Barry, 2011). The size of the Russian 
demonstrations have been comparable to those of the early Rose, Orange and Tulip 
revolution demonstrations (D'Anieri, 2006, p341-345), but smaller if enumerated as a 
proportion of the metropolitan (i.e. Muscovite) or national population. Given that the tipping 
point is more intelligible as a relative rather than an absolute, it seems that even the current 
maximum reliable estimate of the largest protest to date - 120,000 - is not nearly large enough 
to effect change on a large scale, though it has certainly been large enough to concern many 
in the incumbent government. 500,000 may not be an inaccurate estimate however, as that 
was the peak number of protesters present in both Belgrade and Kyiv during the White and 
Orange revolutions respectively. These numbers were reached by drawing people from 
outlying cities and regions from across the geographic extent of Serbia and Ukraine, into the 
capital. Arguably, Russia‟s expansive geography and far greater relative distances make this 
much more difficult to implement in the current context, though it could theoretically double 
the quantity of demonstrators in Moscow if it was achieved.  
 
Analysis: State Attributes 
The Russian Federation is a semi-presidential Eurasian state. The OSCE has made note of 
Russia‟s contemporary political system as one marked by the “convergence of the State and 
the governing party” (OSCE, 2011, p1). Yet it is important not to forget that the current 
Russian system has not developed overnight or even wholly under Putin‟s watch. Rather, it is 
the product of decades of pre- and post-Soviet history. Much of the groundwork for the 
current system was laid immediately following the collapse of USSR. The early Yeltsin years 
had already supplied a telling hint of the balance of power to come in the form of the 1993 
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political gridlock between the president and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, the 
national parliament of the time. In the ensuing constitutional crisis Yeltsin established the 
predominance of the Presidency over the legislature through a mixture of „soft‟ appeals to the 
people and „hard‟ military force. While the military had only chosen to support Yeltsin in the 
eleventh hour, a precedent had nonetheless been set. As Yeltsin‟s handpicked successor, 
Putin can be understood as continuing and consolidating the dominant position of the 
presidency and the executive branch of government, not least of all by working around term 
limit statutes. 
 United Russia and the various facets of the Russian government thus share „space‟ in 
the policy arena that would be unusual (and generally „undemocratic‟) in a Western context. 
Out of favour oligarch and well known critic of the Kremlin Mikhail Khodorkovsky once 
famously described this approach as the “Singapore Model,” telling the Times that it is “a 
term people understand in Russia these days. It means that theoretically you have a free press, 
but in practice there is self-censorship. Theoretically you have courts; in practice the courts 
adopt decisions dictated from above. Theoretically there are civil rights enshrined in the 
constitution; in practice you are not able to exercise some of these rights” (Mortished, 2003). 
This may be a slight over-comparison of the two systems. As the current situation shows, in 
Russia there is less emphasis placed on what rights one may exercise, and more on when. 
Putin himself has said that the protests by “active, mainly young people” were “good to see,” 
and that in some sense the “Putin regime” could take credit for their newly found sense of 
civic freedom. The justification for the subsequent crackdown on political dissent comes 
from the perceived hijacking of the legitimate grievances of this group by external (i.e. 
Western) foes or „foreign agents‟, who wish to foment unrest and instability within Russia for 
their own political and economic gain (Schwirtz and Barry, 2011). Putin further justified this 
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action by noting that the protesters and some foreign governments were acting “in accordance 
with a well known scenario” (i.e. colour revolution) and that “people in our country do not 
want to see the situation escalate to what happened in Kyrgyzstan, or in the recent past in 
Ukraine” (Putin, 2010).  
 Putin is partially correct. The „Putin regime‟ has indeed created an economic space in 
which the incomes of some Russians have risen, and out of which a nascent, largely urban, 
middle class has emerged. This was helped in no small part by increasing economic rents 
derived from a skyrocketing global oil price, generating large profits for Russia‟s newly re-
nationalised oil industry, two luxuries the Yeltsin government did not have throughout the 
1990‟s (Gaddy and Ickes, 2011, pp176-177). In fact, the middle class hypothesis provides a 
fitting explanation as to why there was a seeming burst of social demand for democratic 
ideals followed by two decades of relative dormancy and ambivalence out of which Russian 
society is only beginning to emerge. The average real incomes of Russians only returned to 
the level they were at in 1991 sometime in the period of 2006-2007 (Rogov, 2011, p126). 
Furthermore, January 2011 marked the first time since Soviet collapse that the presidential 
approval rating had become decoupled from national economic performance. Up to this point, 
public approval ratings had generally followed Russia‟s economic fortunes, since that point 
economic sentiment has remained static but support for Putin and Medvedev has fallen 
(Dmitriev and Treisman, 2012).  
 While the 1990‟s is a decade that is remembered fondly by many in the West, few 
Russians would share such a view. Such are the scars left on the collective psychology of 
Russian society by the declining standards of living, plummeting life expectancies and 
economic uncertainty that defined that decade, that the overall social (and governmental) 
preference for order still far exceeds the demand for democratic idealism. Polling carried out 
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by the Levada Center asked Russians which was of greater importance: “order, even if it 
means violating democratic principles, or democracy, even if it means giving free rein to 
destructive elements.” The results are summarised in table 3.5. Even today, an absolute 
majority prefers order, in spite of the hopes for a pluralistic political system displayed earlier 
in table 3.4. In this way, there is still real support for the „party of power‟ from a significant 
portion of the Russian population (Makarenko, 2011, p281). 
 
Table 3.5 Survey Question: “What is more important? Order, even if it means violating democratic principles, 
or democracy, even if it means giving free rein to destructive elements?” 
 
 1993 2000 2004 2006 2007 2009 2010 
Order 75 81 75 68 68 59 56 
Democracy 11 9 13 11 18 18 23 
Difficult to Respond 14 10 12 21 15 22 21 
 
Source: Rogov  (2011) 
 
  
Yet while the „Putin regime‟ has raised incomes it has also, subtly, drawn back some 
of the pluralistic and democratic state attributes Russia gained in the wake of Soviet 
disintegration. The reform of the Federation Council in 2000-2001, the “Yukos affair” in 
2003 (resulting in the arrest of the previously quoted Mikhail Khodorkovsky and a step in the 
nationalisation of the Russian oil industry), and the abolition of the popular election of 
regional governors in 2004 (Makarenko, 2011, p280), have all moved the semi-authoritarian 
Putin government away from the growing section of Russian society that favours democratic 
development.  
 The „party of power‟ duality has had certain implications for the function of United 
Russia. By design it is a political instrument formed out of a consensus by the national 
political and business elite, creating a single-channel system for the expression of political 
interests that persists to this day (Makarenko, 2011, p280). Being active in both the political 
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and bureaucratic spheres has made it a jack of all trades, but master of none. This „big tent‟ 
approach in attempting to include a maximum range of Russia‟s political and bureaucratic 
life has, somewhat ironically, left the party with a weakness it shares with the pro-democracy 
demonstrators. Primarily, this is due to the lack of a strong ideological base. The question of 
what true principles the party has outside of electing and supporting Putin and his allies is a 
valid one to ask. Surkov‟s ideological concept of „sovereign democracy‟ and the creation of 
the youth group Nashi have been attempts to remedy this weakness and plug the gaps, 
arguably meeting a limited degree of success thus far. It is also of little surprise that key 
figures in the party, most notably Putin himself, have at least for now become a replacement 
for ideology within United Russia. 
 If the OSCE is taken at its word, the weakness and ideological vacuum United Russia 
has experienced at the party level has also been transposed to the bureaucratic level, and thus 
to the apparatus of government itself. The apparent back-and-forth and indecisiveness on 
display by the current government may be a hint at this, though it may also simply be a 
reflection of the regime not knowing how exactly to react. Various sources within United 
Russia have posited the perceived liberal drift of the Medvedev era as responsible for the 
current civil unrest, some have even blamed the former president for waking up “this new 
Russian revolution” (Barry, 2012a). This claim is largely unfounded, not least of which due 
to the lack of real civil reforms under Medvedev and the “tandem” nature of the shared 
leadership with the then Prime Minister Putin. It is, at the very least, just as likely that the 
back-and-forth between Putin and Medvedev is designed to give the appearance of plurality 
under the top-down Putin regime (Grove, 2012). Reconciling the increasingly divergent 
interests of those within the system will continue to be a formative feature of Russian state 
attributes as the incumbency attempts to strike a balance between giving the appearance of 
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progress without ceding too much control due to pressure from the outside. Most recently, the 
state has enacted legislation greatly limiting the freedom and external funding for NGO‟s, 
while at the same time implementing reforms liberalising the electoral space, which among 
other things reduces the required number of members for political party status from 40,000 to 
500 (Ostroukh, 2012). This carrot and stick mentality is likely to continue as a response to the 
real and perceived causes of the recent pro-democracy demonstrations. 
 
Dynamics in the Russian regions 
 In the wake of recent events, Russia‟s regions have been noticeably docile relative to 
the national capital. In one sense this is unsurprising given the centrality of the capital in any 
event of this form in Eurasia (Kuzio, 2008, pp101-102). On the other hand, the low overall 
density and geographic sprawl of Russia‟s 143 million people make the regions arguably 
more important than they were in Serbia, Georgia or Ukraine, whose populations are far more 
geographically concentrated. Common stereotypes of regional Russians from both inside and 
outside the country cast this section of the population as “politically apathetic conformist, 
who is resentful of pampered Muscovites, socially conservative, generally pro-Putin, 
suspicious of the West and nostalgic for Soviet order” (Dmitriev and Treisman, 2012). 
Recent studies of this group have served to dispel this myth. While showing that regional 
Russians are, for now, less predisposed to street protest, their level of discontentment with the 
current government and political system is similar to that of urban Russians. The source of 
this discontent is different to that of the urban population, with government corruption and 
ineptness at providing basic services figuring most prominently in this group‟s grievances. 
This difference in attitudes is not all the product of some vastly different rural-urban 
psychological dichotomy, but rather one of living conditions and immediate concerns. As one 
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survey respondent lamented: “what can one say about a global struggle [against corruption] 
when you can‟t drive because the road is full of potholes?” Furthermore, support for Putin in 
the regions grows seemingly thinner by the months, and any further deterioration in economic 
conditions would cause many „non-protesters‟ to revise their position (Dmitriev and 
Treisman, 2012). 
 In this sense the discontent felt by regional Russians may have more in common with 
the 2005-2006 welfare and housing reform protesters than it does with the current pro-
democracy movement. Nevertheless these two positions are in no way contradictory. A more 
accountable and democratic state would arguably decrease corruption and improve the 
delivery of state services and economic assistance. The challenge for the anti-Putin 
movement is thus to form a workable coalition with the regions, the challenge for the 
Kremlin is to maintain the wedge it has placed between these two groups to prevent this from 
happening. Here too then, prospects for the future exist. 
 
Changing the system 
Kremlin strategist and architect of „sovereign democracy‟ Vladislav Surkov has spoken of a 
system than has “already changed,” further noting that the “tectonic structures in society are 
shifting, the social fabric is taking on a new quality” (Adomanis, 2011, Kramer, 2011). At 
face value such statements seem to be an attempt by the government to calm and co-opt 
Russian society, most particularly its most politically active elements, while holding true to 
his government‟s „divide and rule‟ mentality. For example, in one interview Surkov 
referenced the demonstrators as adhering to the colour revolution mentality and “using all the 
newest revolutionary methods,” whilst admitting that at their core the protests were 
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“completely real and natural”  (Adomanis, 2011) and a response to a government that had 
grown “deaf and stupid” over the years. In another interview however, Surkov had derided 
the same movement as “annoyed urbanites” (Kramer, 2011). Yet the Kremlin and its policy 
architects have also implicitly changed „the rules‟ by learning from the colour revolutions and 
adopting policies aimed at biasing the outcome of these events in favour of the incumbency. 
These polices are derivatives of the five archetypes of authoritarian learning noted in Chapter 
Two: isolation, marginalisation, distribution, repression and persuasion.  
 The Putin government has, through the majority of its administrative duration, chosen 
to partially isolate itself, mostly from the European Union and the „West.‟ The recent „foreign 
agents‟ bill tightening non-domestic funding regulations for Russian NGO‟s engaged in 
“political activity,” requiring these organisations to declare themselves as “foreign agents” 
and present quarterly reports to the government, is the latest in a history of such legislative 
measures first begun in 2004 (Finkel and Brudny, 2012b, p17, Sussman, 2010, p139). The 
primary aim of these efforts is to restrict the activities and funding of independent Russian 
NGO‟s perceived, rightly or wrongly, as being proxies for external interests, and thus to 
attain a measure of control over the civic sphere and civil society.   
 The regime has marginalised opposition figures primarily through electoral reform 
legislation enacted in 2005-2006, which raised the electoral threshold from 5% to 7% and 
eliminated the single member district components of the Russian electoral system. Recent 
reforms signed by outgoing President Medvedev, which are designed to appease the 
protesters,  have reversed some aspects of the earlier 2005-2006 changes, including 
significantly lowering the previously noted numerical requirements for party registration and 
re-establishing the electoral threshold at 5% (Ostroukh, 2012). Whether or not such reforms 
will return the system to its more pluralistic 1993-2003 form remains to be seen, though they 
62 
 
are not likely to have any major impact on United Russia‟s governmental monopoly. As 
noted earlier, the incumbency has also attempted to marginalise the opposition via a state 
media campaign putting forth the narrative that the „legitimate grievances‟ of the pro-
democracy demonstrators have been being hijacked by external powers wishing to control 
and take advantage of Russia. 
 The incumbency has a significant degree of control of the distribution of political 
power in the Russian political system. All of the political parties currently represented in the 
Duma: United Russia, A Just Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 
and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) are to a varying extent „Kremlin‟ parties. 
Members who get out of line are often „punished,‟ with the recent expulsion of A Just Russia 
deputy and supporter of the anti-Putin demonstrations Gennady Gudkov serving as a tangible 
example (Astrasheuskaya and Grove, 2012). 
 Repression of the opposition has taken many forms. Using the aftermath of the anti-
Putin protests as the most recent example, the regime has passed new legislation multiplying 
penalties for protesters who take part in demonstrations that injure people or damage property 
by a factor of 120. The potential fine for an individual alone exceeds the average Russian‟s 
annual salary, and can be applied even to demonstrators who obtain a permit but violate any 
of its terms (Herszenhorn, 2012). Protest leader Alexey Navalny has been made the subject of 
embezzlement investigation, a case that had been investigated and dropped years prior by 
prosecutors in the Kirov region (BBC, 2012b). Furthermore, on 11 June 2012, the night 
before the June 12 protests, the homes of Sergei Udaltsov, Alexey Navalny, Kseniya Sobchak 
and other leading figures in the protest movement were raided and searched, with seizures of 
property including literature, funds, lists of supporters and electronic equipment (Barry, 
2012b). 
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 Persuasion may be the technique in which the incumbency has invested the most 
resolution. The central focus of these efforts has been the attempt to create a national 
ideology that is an appealing popular alternative to the values promoted by the colour 
revolutions. Recognising the critical role played by the youth in the colour revolutions, 
Kremlin strategists founded the pro-government Nashi youth organisation. Nashi‟s founding 
doctrine argues that external forces hostile to Russia will always strive to dominate Eurasia, 
and certain internal „enemies‟ will seek to return Russia to the corrupt chaos of 1990‟s 
oligarchical capitalism or to establish a fascist regime. As such it is the role of Nashi to defeat 
this unnatural alliance of liberals, fascists, Western sympathisers, ultra-nationalists and 
international organisations, who have been brought together solely by their shared hatred of 
Putin. In doing so it becomes the role of Nashi to preserve Russia‟s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, foster the development of a domestically grown civil society, modernise the state, 
and to accomplish all this on Russia‟s terms (Finkel and Brudny, 2012b, pp19-20).  
 A second pillar of the Kremlin‟s persuasion strategy has been the creation of an 
ideological rationalisation for Russia‟s current mode of governance, Vladislav Surkov‟s ethos 
of „sovereign democracy.‟ At its core, this ideology is a rejection of Western liberal 
democracy as applicable to the Russian Federation. Surkov asserts that Russia is not a 
Western democratic country with a history of liberalism and a focus on individual rights, but 
rather a continental European nation with established traditions of collectivism and a strong 
state. In such a system the collective realises its aspirations and sovereign will through the 
strong state, which in turn protects the people from the excesses of corrupt domestic elites 
(i.e. oligarchs) and foreign powers (i.e. NATO). On the other hand, attempts to establish (or 
re-establish) a communist or ultra-nationalist regime would plunge the nation back into a 
failed Soviet-type bureaucracy with an inept state and rising ethnic tensions across the 
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country (Finkel and Brudny, 2012b, p28). Such a philosophy is designed to have majority 
appeal, especially in light of the chaotic 1990‟s and the oligarch-dominated Yeltsin era. 
Sovereign democracy also taps into the common Russian cultural belief that a strong state is 
required to keep together a country as large and diverse as Russia. In this way, Surkov‟s 
sovereign democracy is an attempt to create a new, post-Communist ideological basis for 
national unity, as well as casting out rival sources of legitimacy and power, such as Western 
liberalism, as alien to the national culture. 
 
Conclusion:  The central features of Russia’s Grey Revolution 
This section has catalogued the history and features of Russia‟s „Grey Revolution.‟ It has 
explained the defining features and morphology of the protest movement as a product of 
Russia‟s particularly unique state and civil attributes acting within the framework of an 
instance of Eurasian mass civil mobilisation. The Russian pro-democracy protests have also 
allowed us begin updating the „rules of the game‟ for colour revolutions, though these 
outcomes are still far from clear. The subsequent chapter integrates these derived state and 
civil into the framework of Eurasian mass civil mobilisation established in Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The broader perspective 
_____________________________ 
 
The Grey Revolution has had a noticeable impact on political norms, both within the Russian 
Federation and in the other states of post-Soviet Eurasia. This effect has been generated by 
virtue of the Grey Revolution‟s occurrence, rather than its outcomes. Prior to now, the effects 
of regional mass civil destabilization events have flown into Russian Federation from other 
Eurasian states, the „periphery‟ of the former Soviet Union. In the present day, Russia often 
refers to this geographic grouping as its „near abroad,‟ and retains significant political, 
economic and cultural interests in these countries. The Grey Revolution is unique in that it 
has reversed the „flow‟ of colour revolution, which now emanates from the „core‟ of the 
former USSR, Russia itself, into the old „periphery.‟ By any measure, the Russian Federation 
is the most geopolitically significant post-Soviet Eurasian state to have experienced a colour 
revolution type event.  
 Three main paths of development are possible as a result of the Grey Revolution. In 
the first scenario, the demonstrations cause the Russian state to look inward and stimulate 
democratic reform domestically. This scenario has a net positive effect on Eurasian 
democracy by virtue of focusing Russian geopolitical interests away from the periphery, and 
by the diffusion of colour revolution-type democratic idealism through (and throughout) the 
region‟s most dominant and largest state. Conversely the insecurity caused by the mass 
protests could lead the Russian government to a perceived need to assert itself politically. 
This would most likely manifest itself through crack-downs on political opposition 
domestically, and a heightened level of diversionary political intervention in the states of the 
near abroad. This would have a net negative effect on Eurasian democracy as Russia itself 
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would trend further toward authoritarianism, while doing the same to other states in the 
region by encouraging the development of controllable, Russian-backed dictatorial regimes. 
In the third scenario, events can develop in either direction (or at least appear to), before 
returning to a balance similar to current conditions and norms.  
 Adjoined to all these scenarios is the fate of Russia‟s nascent pro-democracy 
movement. Though it appears that protest activity has peaked, a large core group has 
persisted in-spite of crack-downs and the tightening of laws regulating protests. Significantly, 
it is looking increasingly likely that the Putin regime will have to contend with the existence 
of a permanent opposition movement (Weir, 2012). 
 This chapter accounts for the broader implications of Russia‟s Grey Revolution. The 
Russian protest events are evaluated by application of the ten point framework for Eurasian 
mass civil mobilisations enumerated in Chapter One. The section concludes by taking a 
longer-term view of Russian civil development and noting the capacity of the current protests 
to impact domestic and regional political norms. 
 
The colour revolution model applied to the Grey Revolution 
A comparative analysis of the Grey Revolution to other similar instances in the „near abroad‟ 
is justifiable and beneficial as it integrates the Russian protest events into the broader 
framework of Eurasian mass civil mobilisations. Analysing the foundations of the Russian 
protests within the colour revolution framework can help us understand the movement‟s 
underlying strengths, weaknesses and potential consequences. Also, such a comparison can 
not only the help us derive the implications for the Russian Federation, but also provides us 
with a snapshot of the current state of democratic development in post-Soviet Eurasia.  
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 This section takes an all-encompassing view of the colour revolutions, and generates a 
comparative analysis by returning to the ten point framework enumerated in the first chapter. 
The attributes of the Russian events are sequentially analysed and assigned a rating for their 
degree of adherence to colour revolution norms as expressed by the framework, (+/+) for a 
strong adherence, (+/-) for a moderate adherence or partial adherence, and (-/-) for weak or 
insufficient adherence. The score generated by the average of strong adherence (i.e. the sum 
of „+‟) and weak adherence (i.e. the sum of „-‟) can subsequently be used as a base 
measurement of the strength of the Grey Revolution‟s connection to colour revolution norms, 
the relevance of its experience for the other post-Soviet states, and its applicability in 
updating the framework to present day realities.  
 A positive aggregate score would imply the general applicability of the colour 
revolution framework to the pro-democracy protests in the Russian Federation, and their 
relevance in updating regional precedents of protest and dissent. A neutral aggregate score 
would suggest some adherence and applicability of the Grey Revolution to regional norms, 
but with the caveat of requiring additions and qualifications. A negative aggregate score 
implies a weak relationship to the precedents built by previous Eurasian mass mobilisation 
events, and would suggest that the Russian pro-democracy protests would be better analysed 
within a theoretical framework distinct from other anti-authoritarian movements in post-
Soviet Eurasia. 
 The analysis proceeds by the framework‟s original numerical order as it was 
developed Chapter One: 
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A competitive semi-autocratic or -authoritarian state regime that allows enough space in 
the political sphere for the existence of a democratic opposition 
Overall, the current Russian political system exhibits a greater degree of authoritarianism 
than either the Georgian system in 2003 or the Ukrainian in 2004, and a similar degree to that 
of Serbia in 2000 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 (Freedom House, 2012b). Though a democratic 
opposition does demonstrably exist, its parliamentary presence is fragmented and minimal. 
Furthermore, no parties pushing for genuine and significant democratic change (i.e. Yabloko, 
Right Cause) managed to gain representation in the 2011 Russian legislative elections. 
„Managed‟ outcomes were however the electoral results in all colour revolutions, forming the 
spark for the initial mass of protest activity. (+/-)       
 
A ‘return to Europe’ national sentiment or civic nationalism that assists in mobilizing civil 
society 
Russia is a European society (Graham, 2011, p5), though a „Eurasianist‟ strand seeking  to 
establish Russian identity as separate from that of Europe is still a powerful feature of the 
national ideological landscape. The reinforcement of Russia‟s identity as “historically and 
culturally a party of Europe” in Surkov‟s „sovereign democracy‟ and Putin‟s own statements, 
show that the Eurasian isolationist view has fallen out of favour with the leadership (Finkel 
and Brudny, 2012b, p28).  
 Russia‟s relationship is occasionally fractious with some of its E.U. neighbours, 
especially in light of what the Putin government sees as Western meddling in its affairs 
through the funding of „destabilising‟ NGO‟s (Finkel and Brudny, 2012b, p27), and the 
planned (and reformulated) NATO deployment of SM-3 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence 
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interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic, which Russia perceives as a threat to its 
national security (Waterfield, 2012). Even so, for its part the Russian government has 
extended seemingly genuine offers of cooperation in the military (Eckert and Bryanski, 
2012), political (Hallbach, 2012) and economic spheres (Taylor, 2012). Putin himself has 
spoken of a need for a balanced form of European integration to take place, envisioning a 
greater degree of cooperation in the future, and a common economic zone from “Lisbon to 
Vladivostok” (Hallbach, 2012, Taylor, 2012, Pop, 2010). There are early signs of 
reciprocation on the part of the E.U. (Rühe et al., 2010). For their part, the majority of the 
pro-democracy demonstrators advocate a democratic state that is more aligned with European 
normalcy. (+/+) 
 
A preceding political event or crisis that has weakened the incumbent regime 
The current crisis is the result of electoral fraud committed in favour of the „party of power‟ - 
United Russia. Some longer-term controversies continue to follow the Putin government, 
including several high-profile domestic and international assassinations of dissidents and 
opposition journalists. Many have attributed the blame on the Russian government, or even 
Putin himself. Though Russia‟s international reputation has oscillated throughout the past 
decade, Putin has never appeared domestically less popular than today. (+/+) 
 
A media independent and capable enough to effectively convey the instance of the falsified 
vote or other transgression to the broader public 
Information about the occurrence of electoral fraud has been analysed and publicised both by 
the international media, and some liberal Russian outlets. Furthermore, the internet has 
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featured prominently in the mobilisation and organisation efforts of the Russian protests, 
most notably Alexey Navalny‟s anti-corruption blog and the organisation of the first major 
protest, „Saturday at Bolotnaya Square‟ via a Facebook „event.‟ The majority of Russians still 
receive their information through television sources, which are state owned and generally 
biased in favour of the government. However, recent trends in Russia indicate that the 
population is diversifying away from television and state-owned outlets as primary sources of 
news and information. For those who have continued to watch, public trust in the state 
television media has also been experiencing a declining trend (The Moscow Times, 2012). 
(+/-) 
 
A pro-democratic capital city 
Moscow has featured as the focal point of the pro-democracy protests. It is also the only 
region of the Russian Federation where Vladimir Putin did not receive above 50% of the vote 
in the 2012 presidential elections. (+/+) 
 
An unpopular incumbent and/or ruling elite 
The Putin regime has enjoyed widespread, popular majority support in Russia (Lane, 2009, 
p130). However, the popular approval rating of the presidency and prime minister have both 
declined since the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections, though both still 
exceed 50%. In the same Levada Center survey, only 22% of respondents indicated that they 
would be willing to vote for Putin in 2018, and only 7% said they would support Medvedev. 
Approximately half of respondents (49%), indicated that they wanted someone new, while 
22% were undecided (RIAN, 2012a). (+/-) 
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A charismatic opposition candidate  
In spite of the participation of many well-known public figures in the pro-democracy protests, 
a single, charismatic and unifying opposition leader (i.e. a Russian manifestation of a 
Saakashvili or Yushchenko) has not (yet) emerged. (-/-) 
 
A relatively united and organised opposition that is capable of mobilizing tens of thousands 
or more demonstrators  
The opposition has shown itself capable of mobilising tens of thousands of people, and has 
displayed unity in the cause of overthrowing the regime. Opposition groupings in the other 
colour revolutions have featured various degrees of unity. Some opposition coalitions have 
disintegrated over time, others have persevered. Still, the diversity of Russia‟s current 
opposition represents a nuanced expression of such a coalition. (+/-)   
 
Division among the ruling regime’s coercive apparatus 
There appears to be no major division in Russia‟s coercive apparatus, either security or 
military. Though United Russia and its associated elite appears to be less united that in the 
preceding years, with some friction appearing between the prime ministers office and the 
presidency, large scale divisions have not eventuated (Grove, 2012). (-/-) 
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Foreign intervention and/or support 
It is of little secret that certain Russian NGO‟s, including those supporting civil reform and 
democratisation, have received funding from overseas sources. Of particular controversy was 
the 17 January 2012 sojourn of the United States Ambassador to Russia, Michael McFaul, by 
leaders of the opposition. Visitors on the day included Boris Nemtsov, the current leader of 
the Yabloko Party, Sergey Mitrokhin, and Oksana Dmitriyeva, the deputy head of A Just 
Russia. This led some in the Russian media and government to suggest that the opposition 
was „taking orders from the U.S. embassy.‟ Explanations for the visit from the opposition 
leaders themselves have been sparse (Sadovskaya and Beloborodova, 2012). For the most 
part, external support for the Russian pro-democracy movement has been of mostly been of 
an immaterial and symbolic nature (+/-) 
 
--- 
 
 The framework analysis of the Grey Revolution produces an aggregate score of +1 
(+11/-9). This indicates that the colour revolution framework is reasonably applicable to 
events in the Russian Federation. Overall, the situation in Russia is more reminiscent of the 
White and Tulip revolutions than it is of the Orange and Rose. Nevertheless, the Russian 
protests are a well-fitting progression in the broader regional trend of „colour revolutions.‟ 
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Conclusion: The Grey Revolution’s adherence to regional norms 
This chapter has taken a broader perspective on the implications of the Grey Revolution for 
Russian social development and the precedents of mass civil mobilisation in post-Soviet 
Eurasia. The interrelatedness of the colour revolutions and Russia‟s nascent pro-democracy 
movement means that the Grey Revolution has significance as an episode in the wider 
regional trajectory of democratic development. With greater hindsight, it will be possible to 
gauge this impact more clearly and make any required refinements to the colour revolution 
framework. While the final outcome of the protest movement is resigned to the future, it can 
be noted that it has stimulated a „carrot-and-stick‟ pattern of democratic and authoritarian 
reforms in the Russian Federation.  
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Conclusion 
The Grey Revolution as an example of Eurasian protest and dissent 
_____________________________ 
 
Implications for the Russian Federation 
The current development trajectory of the Russian Federation has resulted in a scenario 
where the middle class continues to grow as a proportion of the population, while the political 
„space‟ in which they exist is continually reduced by the Putin „regime.‟ In other words, these 
two socio-political trends have been moving in opposite directions and this Grey Revolution 
has been a first major point of their „convergence.‟ Exempting any major national or global 
economic depressions, the Russian middle class will continue to develop and grow. Likewise, 
barring any significant changes in leadership and political culture, the Russian incumbency 
appears relatively secure to continue in its development of a „managed democracy.‟  Both of 
these socio-political shifts have been tectonic, slow but significant. They also provide an 
underlying explanation as to why events have only reached the fifth step of Tudoroiu‟s 
aforementioned sequence of a colour revolution, “regime‟s denial of the fraud and decision to 
impose official electoral result,” and have not managed to proceed to the sixth, “a division 
within the regime‟s repressive apparatus preventing mass violence.” The longevity and 
seeming permanence of this new formation of pro-democratic forces is a function of this 
„growth in stalemate‟ effect. This is the first major conclusion that can be drawn from my 
study.  
 The second would be to say that it is likely that this „point of convergence‟ is not 
likely be the last, and that the actions of the Russian state from now may very well frame how 
future instances play out. The regime could actuate the promises of democratic reform put 
forth by President Medvedev after the 2011 legislative elections. This could be achieved by 
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denying the Grey Revolution it‟s „revelection‟ but allowing for a „refolution.‟ The alternate 
combination is far less likely, though a hypothetical election that is verified as „fair‟ by 
respected internal and external monitoring organisations could greatly soften the presently 
tense social mood in Russia, and under current conditions, keep the Putin/Medvedev tandem 
in power with a reduced parliamentary majority. The third option for the incumbency is to 
ramp up its campaign of repressive tactics and negative propaganda against the democratic 
opposition in an „all or nothing‟ attempt to stamp it out. This is unlikely to be a viable 
strategy in the long-term, as the current pro-democracy movement has developed organically 
rather than being the wholesale product of one political party or ideology. Given that the 
demand for democratic reform will only rise as the country develops economically, an 
increasing degree of repression will also be required over time. Previous experiences of 
Eurasian mass civil mobilisation show that the primary effect of such a strategy is not 
decreasing the size of the opposition (though this may happen to some extent), but rather to 
increase its propensity for violence as more peaceful options are gradually rendered 
ineffective or inaccessible. The fourth scenario is to pursue the current „carrot-and-stick‟ 
approach, which is likely to eventually result in any of the other three scenarios dependent 
upon the balance and composition of the „carrots‟ and „sticks.‟  
Interconnected with the decisions of the state is the fate of the nascent Russian pro-
democracy movement. Here too some conclusions can be derived from my study. First, the 
protests are unlikely to elicit change in the short-term. Based on the colour revolution 
framework analysis conducted in Chapter 4, we can posit a few reasons for this. The first is 
that to date, a strong, politically viable, and charismatic leading figure has not (yet) emerged. 
Second, a split in either the national political elite or the coercive apparatus has not 
eventuated. This is largely due to Russia‟s political culture, itself a product of not years but 
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decades of Soviet and Russian history. Though the political elite has never appeared more 
dis-unified, the bulk of it has not yet learned how to engage in unified and independent action 
without orders from „above.‟ A similar precedent applies to the military, which has largely 
been subordinate and lacks any unifying political ambition of its own.  Without this elite 
support, even the largest reliably estimated protest size to date, 120,000, is too small to 
succeed without it. At the same time this quantity has proven to be too small to draw in a 
significant amount of elite support to the protesters‟ cause. One of these dynamics needs to 
change if the current stagnation is to be resolved by the civil (as opposed to state) side, and 
reaching anything close to a „snowball effect‟ or „tipping point‟ becomes a feasible prospect 
for the opposition. 
The longer-term is where the protests have a greater chance to elicit success. While 
the demonstrators are hardly representative of what Alexander Herzen once referred to as a 
“senseless and merciless Russian rebellion,” their adherence to the colour revolution ethos of 
non-violence has broadened the movement‟s middle class appeal, and has granted it potential 
longevity, as well as some backers of prominent standing in Russian society. As events in 
Serbia and Ukraine have shown, mass civil mobilisation that appears to fail at the time can 
lay the groundwork, and instil in civil society the necessary motivations for success later on. 
As such we must view the Russian protests, and indeed all colour revolutions, as markers in a 
process of democratisation rather than singular events or episodes. Given that the Grey 
Revolution is a manifestation of the socio-economic development of Russian society, even 
the most belligerent and outright attempts to oppress its current format would not remove the 
underlying social sentiments that brought it into being. A positive outcome of these protest 
events would be a „quiet revolution‟ that leads to democratic reforms in the Russian political 
system. This requires the implicit recognition on the part of Russia‟s political elite that the 
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concerns and aspirations of Russian society are slowly but inevitably changing. Failure to do 
so would likely lead to further civil conflict and unrest, an outcome that arguably is in the 
best interest of Russian society to avoid. 
 
Implications for colour revolutions and potential for future research 
The colour revolutions have had a net positive effect on Eurasian democratic development. 
Serbia‟s decade of successful democratic reform and Georgia‟s recent free and fair 
parliamentary elections are a testament to this fact. The fate of Ukraine‟s Orange Revolution 
appears less certain, though a fair run through of the upcoming 28 October parliamentary 
elections would to some degree confirm that the country is on a similar development path to 
that of Georgia.  Even instances that have „failed,‟ such as Moldova‟s recent Grape 
Revolution, seem to have contributed positively to national democratic development trends.  
 As the first event of this kind in Russia, the nascent Grey Revolution has more in 
common with Serbia in 1997 and Ukraine in 2001 than it does with the revolutions in those 
countries three years later. With greater hindsight, the task for future scholarly research 
would be to use the Russian protest events to update the colour revolution framework. If 
Russia is indeed at the threshold of its own „colour revolution‟ process, a foreseeable second 
task for researchers would be to track and measure the democratic development trajectory of 
the Russian Federation in the years ahead.  
*  *  * 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
ADOMANIS, M. 2011. Vladislav Surkov on the Post-Election Protests: "The System has 
Already Changed" [Online]. Forbes. Available: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2011/12/23/vladislav-surkov-on-the-post-
election-protests-the-system-has-already-changed/2/ [Accessed 10 September 2012]. 
AMOS, H. & SAWER, P. 2011. Russian protests: December 10 as it happened [Online]. The 
Telegraph. Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8947840/Russian-protests-
live.html [Accessed 14 June 2012]. 
ARON, L. 2012. Russia's protesters: The people, ideals and prospects. Washington D.C.: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
ASTRASHEUSKAYA, N. & GROVE, T. 2012. Russian parliament expels anti-Putin deputy 
[Online]. Moscow: Reuters. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-
russia-gudkov-idUSBRE88D0CH20120914 [Accessed 17 September 2012]. 
BARRY, E. 2011a. Rally Defying Putin‟s Party Draws Tens of Thousands [Online]. The 
New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-in-moscow-
russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html [Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
BARRY, E. 2011b. Rousing Russia With a Phrase [Online]. The New York Times. 
Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/world/europe/the-saturday-profile-
blogger-aleksei-navalny-rouses-russia.html [Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
BARRY, E. 2012a. Putin‟s Russia Hits the „Clear‟ Button on the Medvedev Era [Online]. 
The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/world/europe/medvedevs-handiwork-is-erased-
in-putins-russia.html [Accessed 22 September 2012]. 
BARRY, E. 2012b. Raids Target Putin‟s Critics Before Protest [Online]. The New York 
Times Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/world/europe/russian-
investigators-search-apartments-of-top-opposition-leaders.html [Accessed 12 June 
2012]. 
BARRY, E. & KRAMER, A. 2012. In biting cold, protesters pack the center of Moscow 
[Online]. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/europe/tens-of-thousands-protest-putin-
in-moscow-russia.html [Accessed 7 Septermber 2012]. 
BARRY, E., SCHWIRTZ, M., KATES, G. & TIKHOMIROVA, A. 2012. Arrests and 
Violence at Overflowing Rally in Moscow [Online]. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/07/world/europe/at-moscow-rally-arrests-and-
violence.html [Accessed 7 September 2012]. 
BBC. 2012a. Putin tells stadium rally 'battle' is on for Russia [Online]. British Broadcasting 
Corporation. Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17136644 
[Accessed 25 August 2012]. 
BBC. 2012b. Russian blogger Navalny charged with embezzlement [Online]. British 
Broadcasting Corporation Available: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
19060444 [Accessed 11 August 2012]. 
BEISSINGER, M. R. 2007. Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The 
Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions. Perspectives on Politics, 5. 
BRATERSKY, A. & KRAINOVA, N. 2011. Rally Suggests Protest Mood Is Growing 
[Online]. The Moscow Times. Available: 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/rally-suggests-protest-mood-is-
growing/450414.html [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
79 
 
CHAUSOVSKY, E. 2011. Dispatch: Egyptian Unrest and the Former Soviet Union [Online]. 
Stratfor. Available: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20110207-dispatch-egyptian-
unrest-and-former-soviet-union [Accessed 9 August 2012]. 
D'ANIERI, P. 2006. Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39, 331-350. 
DMITRIEV, M. & TREISMAN, D. 2012. The Other Russia: Discontent Grows in the 
Hinterlands. Foreign Affairs, 91. 
ECHO. 2011. ПО ПРЕДВАРИТЕЛЬНЫМ ПОДСЧЕТАМ ДАННЫХ ПРОЕКТА 
"ГРАЖДАНИН-НАБЛЮДАТЕЛЬ", В МОСКВЕ "ЕДИНА РОССИЯ" 
ПРИПИСАЛА СЕБЕ ОКОЛО 17 ПРОЦЕНТОВ ГОЛОСОВ (According to 
preliminary estimates of project "Citizen Observer," in Moscow "United Russia" 
wrote itself [an extra] 17% of the vote) [Online]. ECHO Radio Moscow. Available: 
http://echo.msk.ru/news/836980-echo.html [Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
ECKERT, P. & BRYANSKI, G. 2012. U.S.-Russia joint missile defense is only way forward: 
Putin [Online]. Reuters. Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/20/us-
russia-usa-missile-idUSBRE85J03O20120620 [Accessed 17 July 2012]. 
ELDER, M. 2011a. Medvedev 'tweet' sends the Russian blogosphere into a frenzy [Online]. 
The Guardian Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/07/medvedev-
tweet-russian-blogosphere-frenzy [Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
ELDER, M. 2011b. Rally Defying Putin‟s Party Draws Tens of Thousands [Online]. The 
Guardian. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-
protest-in-moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html?scp=1&sq=thousands&_r=0 
[Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
ELDER, M. 2011c. Russian police and troops clash with protesters in Moscow [Online]. The 
Guardian. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/06/russian-police-
troops-moscow-protest [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
ELDER, M. 2011d. Vladimir Putin mocks Moscow's 'condom-wearing' protesters [Online]. 
The Guardian. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/15/vladimir-
putin-mocks-moscow-protesters [Accessed 12 August 2012]. 
FARHI, F. 2003. The democratic turn: new ways of understanding revolution. In: FORAN, J. 
(ed.) The future of revolutions : rethinking radical change in the age of globalization. 
London ; New York: Zed Books. 
FINKEL, E. & BRUDNY, Y. M. 2012a. No more colour! Authoritarian regimes and colour 
revolutions in Eurasia. Democratization, 19, 1-14. 
FINKEL, E. & BRUDNY, Y. M. 2012b. Russia and the colour revolutions. Democratization, 
19, 15-36. 
FORBES.RU. 2011a. Выборы-2011: коллекция нарушений пополняется (Election-2011: 
Collection of violations updated) [Online]. Forbes Russia. Available: 
http://www.forbes.ru/sobytiya/vlast/77204-vybory-2011-kollektsiya-narushenii 
[Accessed 23 August 2012]. 
FORBES.RU. 2011b. Песков: объем нарушений на выборах в Госдуму не превысил 0,5% 
голосов (Peskov: Extent of rule breaking in the Duma elections did not exceed 0.5% 
of the vote) [Online]. Forbes Russia. Available: http://www.forbes.ru/news/77413-
peskov-obem-narushenii-na-vyborah-v-gosdumu-ne-prevysil-05-golosov [Accessed 
22 August 2012]. 
FREEDOM HOUSE 2012a. Freedom in the World 2012. 
FREEDOM HOUSE 2012b. Freedom in the world timeseries, 1973-2012. 
GADDY, C. G. & ICKES, B. W. 2011. The Russian economy through 2020: The challenge 
of managing rent addiction. In: LIPMAN, M. A. & PETROV, N. (eds.) Russia in 
80 
 
2020 : scenarios for the future. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
GAZETA. 2011a. Митинг Яблока за честные выборы на Болотной закончился, 
очевидцы говорят о 5 тысячах участников [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/12/17/n_2138378.shtml [Accessed 12 June 
2012]. 
GAZETA. 2011b. Наблюдатели заметили расхождение данных протоколов и сайта 
Мосгоризбиркома: это уже наглость (Observers noticed a divergence from 
[electoral] protocol and site Mosgorizbirkoma: Now this is arrogance) [Online]. 
Gazeta.ru. Available: http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/12/05/n_2123322.shtml 
[Accessed 20 August 2012]. 
GAZETA. 2012. Митинг За честные выборы на Болотной площади закончился: 120 
тысяч, следующий будет 26 февраля [Online]. Available: 
http://www.gazeta.ru/news/lastnews/2012/02/04/n_2191809.shtml [Accessed 17 
October 2012]. 
GOLDSTONE, J. A. 2001. Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 4, 139-187. 
GRAHAM, T. 2011. Russia and the World. In: LIPMAN, M. A. & PETROV, N. (eds.) 
Russia in 2020 : scenarios for the future. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
GRANI.RU. 2012. Мэрия согласовала "Марш миллионов" 15 сентября [Online]. 
Available: http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/activism/m.206257.html [Accessed 17 
September 2012]. 
GROVE, T. 2011. Russia's Chechnya: How did Putin's party win 99 percent? [Online]. 
Reuters. Available: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/22/uk-russia-chechnya-
elections-idUKTRE7BK1BU20111222 [Accessed 16 August 2012]. 
GROVE, T. 2012. Russia's Medvedev offers rare criticism of Putin [Online]. Reuters. 
Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/21/russia-medvedev-putin-
idUSL5E8KLMPZ20120921 [Accessed 24 September 2012]. 
HALE, H. E. 2005. Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet 
Eurasia. World Politics, 58, 133-165. 
HALE, H. E. 2006. Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as 
normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism. Communist and Post-Communist 
Studies, 39, 305-329. 
HALLBACH, U. 2012. Vladimir Putin's Eurasian Union. Berlin: German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs. 
HERSZENHORN, D. M. 2012. New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protesters 
[Online]. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/europe/putin-signs-law-with-harsh-fines-
for-protesters-in-russia.html [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
HERSZENHORN, D. M. & BARRY, E. 2011. Putin Contends Clinton Incited Unrest Over 
Vote [Online]. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/world/europe/putin-accuses-clinton-of-
instigating-russian-protests.html?_r=0 [Accessed 24 August 2012]. 
KIMMAGE, D. 2005. Uneasy days in Kyrgyzstan [Online]. Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty. Available: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1058085.html [Accessed 19 
August 2012]. 
81 
 
KOROSTELEVA, E. 2009. Was There a Quiet Revolution? Belarus After the 2006 
Presidential Election. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25, 324-
346. 
KOROSTELEVA, E. 2012. Questioning democracy promotion: Belarus' response to the 
„colour revolutions‟. Democratization, 19, 37-59. 
KRAMER, A. 2011. A Kremlin Strategist Tries to Defuse Discontent and Undermine the 
Protesters‟ Leaders [Online]. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/world/europe/kremlin-points-to-medvedev-
speech-as-proof-of-change.html [Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
KUNOV, A., MYAGKOV, M., SITNIKOV, A. & SHAKIN, D. 2005. Putins party of power 
and the declining power of parties in Russia. The Foreign Policy Centre. 
KUZIO, T. 2006. Ukraine Is Not Russia: Comparing Youth Political Activism. SAIS Review, 
26, pp 67-83. 
KUZIO, T. 2008. Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist 
Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave. Demokratizatsiya, 16, 97-
109. 
LANE, D. 2008. The Orange Revolution: „People's Revolution‟ or Revolutionary Coup? 
British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 10, 525-549. 
LANE, D. 2009. „Coloured Revolution‟ as a Political Phenomenon. Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics, 25, 113-135. 
LENTA. 2012a. Митинг "За честные выборы" на Новом Арбате завершился [Online]. 
Available: http://lenta.ru/news/2012/03/10/over/ [Accessed 17 August 2012]. 
LENTA. 2012b. ЦИК признал несостоятельными 90 процентов жалоб на думские 
выборы (CEC declares untenable 90 percent of grievances against the Duma 
elections) [Online]. Lenta.ru. Available: http://lenta.ru/news/2012/02/04/ninety/ 
[Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
MAKARENKO, B. 2011. Scenarios for the evolution of the Russian political party system. 
In: LIPMAN, M. A. & PETROV, N. (eds.) Russia in 2020 : scenarios for the future. 
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
MCFAUL, M. 2005. Transitions from postcommunism. Journal of Democracy, 16, 5-19. 
MENDELSON, S. & GERBER, T. 2005. Soviet nostalgia: An impediment to Russian 
democratization. The Washington Quarterly, 29, 83-96. 
MORTISHED, C. 2003. Russian tycoon caught in winds of democratic change. The Times. 
MYERS, S. L. 2006. In Belarus, expecting to lose, then win. International Herald Tribune. 
OBYDENKOVA, A. V. 2012. Democratization at the grassroots: the European Union's 
external impact. Democratization, 19, 230-257. 
OLIPHANT, R. 2012. Anti-Putin protests return to Moscow's freezing streets [Online]. The 
Telegraph. Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-
putin/9061502/Anti-Putin-protests-return-to-Moscows-freezing-streets.html 
[Accessed 11 August 2012]. 
OSCE 2011. Russian Federation, State Duma Elections – 4 December 2011: Statement of 
preliminary findings and conclusions. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. 
OSTROUKH, A. 2012. Russia's Putin signs NGO "foreign agents" law [Online]. Reuters. 
Available: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/21/us-russia-putin-ngos-
idUSBRE86K05M20120721 [Accessed 22 September 2012]. 
POLITONLINE. 2011. В Леваде не верят в график 'Гаусса против Чурова', а 
математики его опровергают (At the Levada [Centre] there is no belief in the 
graphic 'Guass against Churov,' and mathematicians refute it) [Online]. 
82 
 
Politonline.ru. Available: http://www.politonline.ru/comments/10036.html [Accessed 
22 August 2012]. 
POLITONLINE. 2012. Как митинг на Поклонной собрал около 140 000 человек (How the 
meeting on the Poklonnaya [Hill] gathered approximately 140 000 people] [Online]. 
PolitOnline.ru. Available: http://www.politonline.ru/comments/10432.html [Accessed 
27 July 2012]. 
POP, V. 2010. Putin proposes Russia-EU union [Online]. EU Observer. Available: 
http://euobserver.com/economic/31361 [Accessed 9 August 2012]. 
PUTIN, V. 2004. Poslanie Federal‟nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Annual Address 
to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) [Online]. Available: 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2004/05/71501.shtml [Accessed 2 August 
2012]. 
PUTIN, V. 2010. Председатель Правительства Российской Федерации В.В.Путин 
провѐл заседание Координационного совета Общероссийского народного 
фронта (Prime Minister of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin conducts a meeting of 
the Coordinating Council of the Russian Popular Front) [Online]. Parliament of the 
Russian Federation. Available: http://government.ru/docs/17330/print/ [Accessed 1 
September 2012]. 
RAKHMANOVA, T. 2006. Democratic revolutionary handbook. Brooklyn, NY: First 
Run/Icarus Films,. 
RFE/RL. 2012. Russia: Protest movements are coordinating and stepping up efforts [Online]. 
RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Available: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1066430.html [Accessed 29 August 2012]. 
RIAN. 2011a. United Russia gets over 99 percent of votes in Chechnya [Online]. RIA-
Novosti. Available: http://en.rian.ru/society/20111205/169358392.html [Accessed 16 
August 2012]. 
RIAN. 2011b. Сколько человек может вместить проспект Сахарова в Москве [Online]. 
RIA-Novosti. Available: http://ria.ru/infografika/20111223/524373513.html 
[Accessed 17 August 2012]. 
RIAN. 2011c. Сколько человек может вместить проспект Сахарова в Москве [Online]. 
RIA-Novosti. Available: http://ria.ru/infografika/20111223/524373513.html 
[Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
RIAN. 2012a. Putin‟s Approval Rating Slumps - Survey [Online]. Moscow: RIA-Novosti. 
Available: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120824/175408725.html [Accessed 21 September 
2012]. 
RIAN. 2012b. Сколько человек вмещает Поклонная гора [Online]. RIA-Novosti. 
Available: http://www.ria.ru/infografika/20120203/555840256.html [Accessed 9 
September 2012]. 
ROGOV, K. 2011. The "third cycle": Is Russia headed back to the future? In: LIPMAN, M. 
A. & PETROV, N. (eds.) Russia in 2020 : scenarios for the future. Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
RÜHE, V., NAUMANN, K., ELBE, F. & WEISSER, U. 2010. It's Time to Invite Russia to 
Join NATO [Online]. Der Spiegel. Available: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/open-letter-it-s-time-to-invite-russia-to-
join-nato-a-682287.html [Accessed 22 March 2012]. 
SADOVSKAYA, Y. & BELOBORODOVA, O. 2012. Получение инструкций в 
посольстве США (Receiving instructions at the embassy of the U.S.A) [Online]. 
Gazeta Vizgliyad. Available: http://www.vz.ru/politics/2012/1/17/554224.html 
[Accessed 20 June 2012]. 
83 
 
SCHWIRTZ, M. 2011. Few at Putin Party‟s Rally, and Even Fewer Willingly [Online]. The 
New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/europe/attendance-is-light-at-united-
russia-rally.html [Accessed 16 July 2012]. 
SCHWIRTZ, M. & BARRY, E. 2011. On TV, Putin Is Dismissive of Critics Far and Near 
[Online]. The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/world/europe/putin-answers-questions-on-
television-on-russian-election.html [Accessed 18 September 2012]. 
SHPILKIN, S. 2011. Elections improbabilty [Online]. gazeta.ru. Available: 
http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2011/12/13/a_3926402.shtml [Accessed 22 August 2012]. 
SIMECKA, M. 2009. Diffusion and civil society mobilization in coloured revolutions. CEU 
Political Science Journal, 4, 1+. 
STOLYAROVA, G. 2012. Thousands take to city streets for protest [Online]. The St. 
Petersburg Times. Available: 
http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=20875 [Accessed 15 
August 2012]. 
SULIMINA, A. 2012. The empire strikes back [Online]. The Moscow News. Available: 
http://www.themoscownews.com/politics/20111208/189271247.html [Accessed 22 
August 2012]. 
SUSSMAN, G. 2010. Branding democracy : U.S. regime change in post-Soviet Eastern 
Europe, New York, Peter Lang. 
TAYLOR, A. 2012. Vladimir Putin Has Kindly Offered To Save Europe [Online]. The 
Business Insider. Available: http://articles.businessinsider.com/2012-02-
28/europe/31106546_1_european-union-vladimir-putin-olive-branch [Accessed 26 
July 2012]. 
THE ECONOMIST. 2009. Moldova burning [Online]. Available: 
http://www.economist.com/node/13447119?story_id=13447119 [Accessed 19 July 
2012]. 
THE GUARDIAN. 2005. Protests in Kyrgyzstan [Online]. Available: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,,1444067,00.html [Accessed 19 August 2012]. 
THE GUARDIAN. 2011. Russian election protests – Saturday 10 December 2011 [Online]. 
The Guardian. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/global/2011/dec/10/russia-
elections-putin-protest [Accessed 25 August 2012]. 
THE GUARDIAN. 2012. Russians turn out in their thousands to protest against Vladimir 
Putin [Online]. Available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/12/russians-
thousands-protest-vladimir-putin [Accessed 17 August 2012]. 
THE HUFFINGTON POST. 2011. Thousands Protest In Moscow Against Election Fraud 
[Online]. Available: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/12/24/thousands-protest-
in-moscow_n_1168659.html?ref=uk [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
THE MOSCOW TIMES. 2012. Russians' Confidence in State TV Slipping [Online]. 
Available: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russians-confidence-in-
state-tv-slipping/456214.html [Accessed 22 July 2012]. 
TUDOROIU, T. 2007. Rose, Orange, and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions. 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40, 315-342. 
WATERFIELD, B. 2012. Russia threatens Nato with military strikes over missile defence 
system [Online]. The Telegraph. Available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russia-threatens-
Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html [Accessed 7 June 2012]. 
84 
 
WEIR, F. 2012. Protests are looking permanent in Russia [Online]. The Christian Science 
Monitor. Available: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0612/Protests-
are-looking-permanent-in-Russia [Accessed 5 August 2012]. 
WILSON, A. 2005. Ukraine's orange revolution, New Haven, Conn. ; London, Yale 
University Press. 
WILSON, A. 2006. Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West. 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19, 21-32. 
WILSON, J. L. 2009. Coloured Revolutions: The View from Moscow and Beijing. Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 25, 369-395. 
ZAKS, D. 2011. Putin derides 'leaderless' Russian protestors [Online]. Moscow: AFP. 
Available: 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ggyQz2ooU1g8NQYyZpwt8
nrimziw?docId=CNG.76b1512399ae73ce46577ad3def7ddb0.581 [Accessed 21 
August 2012]. 
 
 
